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As today’s networks are no longer individual networks, networks are less robust towards
failures and attacks. For example, computer networks and power networks are interdepen-
dent. Computer networks provide smart control for power networks, while power networks
provide power supply. Localized network failures and attacks are amplified and exacerbated
back and forth between two networks due to their interdependencies. This dissertation
focuses on finding solutions to enhance network robustness. Software-defined networking
provides a programmable architecture, which can dynamically adapt to any changes and
can reduce the complexities of network traffic management. This architecture brings oppor-
tunities to enhance network robustness, for example, adapting to network changes, routing
traffic bypassing malfunction devices, dropping malicious flows, etc. However, as SDN is
rapidly proceeding from vision to reality, the SDN architecture itself might be exposed to
some robustness threats. Especially, the SDN control plane is tremendously attractive to
attackers, since it is the “brain” of entire networks. Thus, researching on network robustness
helps protect network from a destructive disaster.
In this dissertation, we first build a novel, realistic interdependent network framework to
model cyber-physical networks. We allocate dependency links under a limited budget and
evaluate network robustness. We further revise a network flow algorithm and find solutions
to obtain a basic robust network structure. Extensive simulations on random networks and
real networks show that our deployment method produces topologies that are more robust
than the ones obtained by other deployment techniques.
Second, we tackle middlebox chain problems using SDN. In computer networks, applica-
tions require traffic to sequence through multiple types of middleboxes to accomplish network
functionality. Middlebox policies, numerous applications’ requirements, and resource alloca-
tions complicate network management. Furthermore, middlebox failures can affect network
robustness. We formulate a mixed-integer linear programming problem to achieve a network
load-balancing objective in the context of middlebox policy chain routing. Our global rout-
ing approach manages network resources efficiently by simplifying candidate-path selections,
balancing the entire network and using the simulated annealing algorithm. Moreover, in case
of middlebox failures, we design a fast rerouting mechanism by exploiting the remaining link
and middlebox resources locally. We implement proposed routing approaches on a Mininet
testbed and evaluate experiments’ scalability, assessing the effectiveness of the approaches.
Third, we build an adversary model to describe in detail how to launch distributed denial
of service (DDoS) attacks to overwhelm the SDN controller. Then we discuss possible defense
mechanisms to protect the controller from DDoS attacks. We implement a successful DDoS
attack and our defense mechanism on the Mininet testbed to demonstrate its feasibility in
the real world.
In summary, we vertically dive into enhancing network robustness by constructing a
topological framework, making routing decisions, and protecting the SDN controller.
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Abstract
As today’s networks are no longer individual networks, networks are less robust towards
failures and attacks. For example, computer networks and power networks are interdepen-
dent. Computer networks provide smart control for power networks, while power networks
provide power supply. Localized network failures and attacks are amplified and exacerbated
back and forth between two networks due to their interdependencies. This dissertation
focuses on finding solutions to enhance network robustness. Software-defined networking
provides a programmable architecture, which can dynamically adapt to any changes and
can reduce the complexities of network traffic management. This architecture brings oppor-
tunities to enhance network robustness, for example, adapting to network changes, routing
traffic bypassing malfunction devices, dropping malicious flows, etc. However, as SDN is
rapidly proceeding from vision to reality, the SDN architecture itself might be exposed to
some robustness threats. Especially, the SDN control plane is tremendously attractive to
attackers, since it is the “brain” of entire networks. Thus, researching on network robustness
helps protect network from a destructive disaster.
In this dissertation, we first build a novel, realistic interdependent network framework to
model cyber-physical networks. We allocate dependency links under a limited budget and
evaluate network robustness. We further revise a network flow algorithm and find solutions
to obtain a basic robust network structure. Extensive simulations on random networks and
real networks show that our deployment method produces topologies that are more robust
than the ones obtained by other deployment techniques.
Second, we tackle middlebox chain problems using SDN. In computer networks, applica-
tions require traffic to sequence through multiple types of middleboxes to accomplish network
functionality. Middlebox policies, numerous applications’ requirements, and resource alloca-
tions complicate network management. Furthermore, middlebox failures can affect network
robustness. We formulate a mixed-integer linear programming problem to achieve a network
load-balancing objective in the context of middlebox policy chain routing. Our global rout-
ing approach manages network resources efficiently by simplifying candidate-path selections,
balancing the entire network and using the simulated annealing algorithm. Moreover, in case
of middlebox failures, we design a fast rerouting mechanism by exploiting the remaining link
and middlebox resources locally. We implement proposed routing approaches on a Mininet
testbed and evaluate experiments’ scalability, assessing the effectiveness of the approaches.
Third, we build an adversary model to describe in detail how to launch distributed denial
of service (DDoS) attacks to overwhelm the SDN controller. Then we discuss possible defense
mechanisms to protect the controller from DDoS attacks. We implement a successful DDoS
attack and our defense mechanism on the Mininet testbed to demonstrate its feasibility in
the real world.
In summary, we vertically dive into enhancing network robustness by constructing a
topological framework, making routing decisions, and protecting the SDN controller.
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Software-defined networking (SDN) is becoming increasingly important, bringing benefits
that will potentially reform today’s computer network. We propose to enhance network
robustness using SDN. In this chapter, we first present our motivations by introducing the
role of SDN and the importance of network robustness in section 1.1. Second, we introduce
the concepts of network robustness, SDN, OpenFlow, and middlebox in section 1.2. Third,
we highlight our contributions in section 1.3. Finally, the organization of this dissertation is
introduced in section 1.4.
1.1 Introduction and motivation
Traditional computer networks rely on sophisticated protocols on legacy routers/switches
to provide numerous services. This leads to Internet ossification, which means the current
Internet has little space to scale. However, the population of network users is increasing dra-
matically, and users’ requests are becoming more diverse. Data representing global internet
traffic, in petabytes per month, is shown in Fig. 1.11.
Moreover, monthly active users of Facebook have been increasing dramatically over the
last 13 years and reached 2 billion by the end of June 20174. Monthly global mobile data
traffic is projected to be 49 exabytes by 2021, with annual traffic exceeding half a zettabyte5.
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Figure 1.1: Global internet traffic (petabytes per month) over the past 11 years1.
The United States will need to invest up to $150 billion in fiber infrastructure over the next
five to seven years to support networking demand6. Furthermore, recent data, as reported
by Sandvine, indicate more than 70 percent of North American traffic is now streaming video
and audio7. Streaming traffic is delay-sensitive and consumes large bandwidth.
Security issues are another concern on today’s network. Recently, credit-reporting firm
Equifax revealed that hackers might have stolen financial and consumer data on at least
143 million customers8. Those data include birth dates, social security numbers, driver’s
licenses and addresses, which could lead to severe identity theft issues, and immeasurably
harm the U.S. finance credit system in the long run. In 2016, major Internet platforms
and services couldn’t be accessed in Europe and North America, because Dyn servers were
under DDoS attacks9. Such security threats have become even more severe in recent years.
Microsoft cloud user accounts saw a 300 percent increase in cyberattacks in 201610. Cisco’s
2017 mid-year cybersecurity report indicates that 34 percent of service providers lost revenue
from attacks. Moreover, the new destruction of service (DeOS) attacks are not aiming at
attacking, but at destroying networks by preventing defenders from restoring systems and
2
data11.
Traditional computer networks may face problems in adapting to the dynamics and re-
quirements of numerous applications. Fortunately, the concept of SDN makes this possible
by assigning networks more flexibility and programmability. SDN refers to a network ar-
chitecture enabling programmability and separating the control plane from the data plane.
It reforms sophisticated legacy routers/switches as simple forwarding elements, and further
supports network scalabilities and innovations. It highlights the importance of software and
allows us to manage network operations via open interfaces to further reduce expenditures.
For example, AT&T CTO expects SDN to reduce operational expenses by 40 percent by
202012, and CenturyLink’s CEO, Glen Post, said his company remains on track to see at
least $200 million in annual capital expenditures reduction13.
SDN is rapidly moving from vision to reality. Tech news indicated an incomplete list of
42 vendors offering SDN products14. Moreover, a number of SDN startups have already been
bought by larger companies, validating their potential. In 2012, VMware bought Nicira for
$1.25 billion. Then Juniper bought Contrail Systems for $176 million15.
Among its advantages, SDN brings opportunities to enhance a computer network’s ro-
bustness. First, SDN provides centralized management with visibility of entire networks.
One popular realization of SDN is OpenFlow16. The SDN controller supports acquiring flow
statistics from OpenFlow switches in real time. This helps identify potential threats and
speed up troubleshooting to guarantee network availability. Second, routing and rerouting
flows are managed by the controller on the fly. For example, SDN incorporates middleboxes
and dynamically routes flows along middlebox chains to accomplish network functionality.
These middleboxes help improve network robustness, e.g., by use of a load balancer to cir-
cumvent overloads and an IDS to detect anomalies. Moreover, SDN can flexibly reroute
traffic bypassing malfunction devices or drop malicious flows. Third, flow tables on Open-
Flow switches are updated by running programs on the controller. Network operators are no
longer required to remotely log in and configure each switch, which makes network more ro-
bust against any type of manual configuration errors. Moreover, SDN allows for eliminating
policy conflicts and attacks by simply programming the OpenFlow controller.
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When we enhance network robustness using SDN, we also need to study corresponding
issues. Massive research has been exploiting opportunities and innovating promising appli-
cations under SDN architecture; however, the design of SDN itself is conversely exposed to
security challenges. The issue of SDN robustness becomes a concern, before it can become a
substitute for traditional networks. On one side, we exploit the flexibility of SDN to enhance
network robustness. On the other side, the decoupled architecture itself might be exposed
to some security threats.
In general, today’s networks are independent networks. This leads to a situation where
localized damage in one system will be extended to another system through their depen-
dency links, triggering cascading failures and finally bringing large-scale damage2;17;18. For
example, the 2003 Italy blackout affected a total of 56 million people. Consequently, network
robustness is of great importance to ensure network availability, resilience, and adaption to
changing scenarios.
1.2 Background
In this section, we introduce the concepts of network robustness and SDN, since SDN is
the major technology to improve network robustness in this dissertation. Then, we present
“OpenFlow,” an SDN standard, and “middlebox,” one type of network device.
1.2.1 Network robustness
Network robustness refers to a network’s ability to withstand failures and attacks — a critical
attribute to evaluate networks. It ensures network availability, resilience, and adaption to
changing scenarios.
Current networks (e.g. biological, biosocial, electric, electronic, etc.) are no longer in-
dividual networks19–21, because one network often depends on another. For example, the
power network provides electricity to the computer network and, through the computer
network, computers gather information reported from the power network, consequently con-
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trolling the power network. Localized damage in one network will be propagated to the other
one through dependency links, triggering cascading failures and finally bringing large-scale
damage17;18. A robust framework with proper allocation of dependency links can protect
networks from these large-scale damages. Moreover, SDN can be the enabling technology
in the computer network, thus affecting the robustness of the network framework. With
flexibilities of SDN to be discussed in subsection 1.2.2, and functionalities of middleboxes
to be discussed in subsection 1.2.3, attacks and failures could be detected and eliminated
within computer networks before being propagated, thus enhancing network robustness.
1.2.2 Software-defined networking
SDN is an emerging networking architecture with a design of decoupling the control plane
and the data plane, which, consequently, simplifies network management, lowers the cost of
network devices’ deployment, and potentially reforms today’s networks.
With increasing needs of numerous applications and enormous user demand, traditional
computer networks are becoming more complex. In traditional computer networks, there
are a large number of network devices, e.g., routers and middleboxes 1.2.4, with complicated
protocols running on them. Those devices are not only in charge of packet forwarding,
but are also responsible for accomplishing network functions and conducting sophisticated
management. Such integration of control logics and forwarding elements makes current IP
networks very difficult to scale and evolve. We call it Internet ossification and its details are
listed as follows:
1. Devices are vendor-specific. Network devices differ based on vendors and provide limited
interfaces to be configured. This does not allow network operators to easily update
network states. Network operators have to configure each network device separately.
They also need to reconfigure them when there are network failures and policy changes.
Moreover, such configurations are error-prone and very difficult to scale.
2. Protocols are sophisticated. To accomplish various policies, a set of protocols need to
be implemented. As needs of numerous applications increase, these protocols become
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more sophisticated and may conflict with each other. Network evolvement is caught in a
dilemma as to whether to gain more intelligence and sophistication, or not.
3. Testing platforms are insufficient. New ideas should be tested in realistic settings to
validate their practicality. However, research traffic cannot be isolated from production
traffic and this might lead to severe consequences in current IP networks16. A new routing
protocol can take five to 10 years to be fully designed, evaluated, and deployed in current
IP networks22.
SDN architecture consists of three planes and two interfaces, that is, application plane,
control plane and data plane; and northbound interface and southbound interface, shown in
Fig. 1.2. The biggest innovation is the separation of the control plane and the data plane.
All control logics are defined in the control plane, and the data plane is only responsible
for forwarding. That simplifies network management and further allows network to scale
to adapt to increasing demands. The three planes are logically separated, but they might
coexist with each other physically.
Figure 1.2: SDN architecture consists of three planes and two types of interfaces.
Compared with traditional computer networks, SDN has the following advantages:
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1. Centralized management — an SDN controller has an overview of entire networks, sim-
plifies traffic management to adapt to different application requirements, and provides
better network supervision23;24. All control logics are managed by authenticated appli-
cations and dispatched through the control-to-data plane channel using an OpenFlow
protocol.
2. Flexibility — SDN’s data plane is only responsible for forwarding packets. It assigns
more flexibilities on the networks without manually configuring legacy routers/switches.
Once network policies or conditions change, switches receive updated commands from the
controller and simply follow those instructions.
3. Programmability — SDN architecture introduces the ability of programmability. Network
operators can control and update network behaviors by programming each network device
dynamically via open interfaces. Such software programs are easier operated and less
error-prone25.
4. Innovation — SDN allows network innovations by isolating research traffic from pro-
duction traffic, and helps with new protocol tests in realistic settings. It also provides
functionalities of access control, load balancing, network monitoring, etc. to gradually
substitute traditional computer networks, and further stimulates innovations.
1.2.3 OpenFlow
OpenFlow is the current SDN de-facto standard26. It is a communication protocol between
the control plane and the data plane. Unless specified, switches in the data plane discussed
in this dissertation are OpenFlow-enabled switches.
OpenFlow switch
An OpenFlow switch consists of one or more flow tables, a group table, and one or more
OpenFlow channels connected to a remote controller27.
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Figure 1.3: A flow entry consists of header fields, actions, and counters.
The flow table contains a list of flow entries 1.3, which perform packet matching and
define forwarding actions. Each flow entry in the flow table consists of three fields: header
fields, actions, and counters. In the header fields, 12 fields, defined in OpenFlow 1.0, classify
a flow and provide various matching possibilities to meet different applications’ requirements.
Actions can be various and flexible — dropping the flow, forwarding the flow, or even chang-
ing flow content, etc. We can also customize actions. Counters are collected at the line rate,
and further used for network monitoring and management.
The OpenFlow channel refers to the interface connecting the OpenFlow switch to the
controller. OpenFlow defines a set of messages, e.g., symmetric messages “hello” and asyn-
chronous messages “packet-in,” to communicate or update status with the controller via this
channel. The controller can also configure and manage OpenFlow switches via the channel.
In addition, such communication is optionally secured by a transport layer security (TLS)
protocol.
Flow forwarding
When a packet arrives at an OpenFlow switch, packet header fields are extracted to try to
match the header fields of flow entries. When it matches the header field in a flow entry, it
will conduct the corresponding actions. If a flow cannot find a matching flow entry, it will be
encapsulated with an OpenFlow protocol header and forwarded to the controller to request
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a new flow-entry installation. After the new flow entry is installed, matched packets will be
forwarded according to its actions.
The new flow entry can be installed either proactively by the controller or as requested,
indicated above. The controller can also update and delete flow entries in flow tables.
1.2.4 Middlebox
Middlebox is a graphic description of an existing internet phenomenon providing network
functions other than IP routing. Since it is implemented as an intermediary box between
a source host and a destination host, it is called “middlebox”28. In traditional computer
networks, all functions above the IP layer, except IP routing functions, can be considered
as middlebox functions. For example, firewalls, proxies, DNS servers, and load balancers
are middleboxes, while IP routers are not. In SDN networks, switches are not considered
as middleboxes, while other functions are, as indicated above29. Today’s network relies
on these middleboxes to guarantee critical network functions, e.g., security inspection and
performance improvement. For example, load balancers are used to circumvent overloads,
and further improve network performance and robustness. RFC 3234 details taxonomy and
issues about middleboxes28.
Middlebox deployment
Middleboxes can be deployed in path 1.4 or off path 1.5. Off-path deployment is more
robust and can ensure end-to-end connectivity when failures occur. It is also more efficient
and flexible, since we only route flows to go through middleboxes as needed.
Middlebox policy chain
Network applications require traffic to sequence through multiple types of middleboxes to
accomplish desired network functions. We call this “middlebox policy chain.” For example,
flows have to first go through a firewall and then an IDS for security purposes29, shown in
Fig. 1.6.
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Figure 1.4: Middlebox in-path deployment — all flows on the red path are forced to be sent
through the middlebox, such as a firewall (FW).
Figure 1.5: Middlebox off-path deployment — secure flows are sent along the green path,
while others are sent through the firewall for inspection.
Figure 1.6: Example of a middlebox chain — flows sequenced through a firewall and then
an IDS.
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In a larger network with numerous middleboxes, flow routings along middlebox chains
become complex23, which might create false configurations. It is also difficult to dynamically
update routing paths. It is even more challenging to enable middlebox chains within limited
network resources.
1.3 Contributions
We vertically dive into enhancing network robustness by constructing a topological frame-
work, making routing decisions, and protecting the SDN controller. Our major contributions
can be summarized as follows:
1. We have designed and thoroughly tested an optimization-based scheme to allocate depen-
dency links within a budget constraint, where the numbers of nodes in the two networks
are not identical. To this end, we have built a realistic cyber-physical network framework
with one-to-multiple dependencies, two unequal-size individual networks, and weighted
dependency links. Cyber-physical networks are in essence interdependent networks, where
one network supports and affects the other through dependency links. Localized net-
work failures and attacks are amplified and exacerbated back and forth between the two
networks due to their interdependencies. We allocate dependency links to obtain more
network robustness under this realistic framework.
2. We have developed two routing schemes for middlebox policy enforcement to improve
network robustness. This is the first work to handle failures in middlebox chain scenarios
using OpenFlow. With our designs, network resources are managed efficiently to circum-
vent overloads, and the network can rapidly respond to middlebox failures. Consequently,
network robustness is improved. Moreover, results of the optimization on a test topol-
ogy include an increase up to 26.4 percent of the throughput, with respect to sequenced
shortest-path routing.
3. We have explored vulnerabilities of the SDN controller from the attacker’s point of view
and have detailed the adversary model. We have presented preliminary results for several
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strategies to protect the controller from saturation attacks. This work contributes funda-
mentally to detect and mitigate the SDN control plane’s vulnerabilities, and to further
enhance network robustness.
1.4 Organization
This dissertation is organized into chapters. In chapter 2, we present a thorough literature
review on the issues of network robustness. In chapter 3, we propose a novel robust network
framework and allocate dependency links to obtain more network robustness. In chapter 4,
we further enhance network robustness by managing middlebox policies and handling mid-
dlebox failures using SDN. In chapter 5, we build a detailed adversary model to identify
vulnerabilities of the SDN control plane, and present preliminary results on possible defense




Software-defined networking (SDN) is an emerging networking architecture that reduces com-
plexities of network traffic management and presents a design of programmable networks that
can adapt to changing application requirements25. SDN provides functionalities of access
control, load balancing, network monitoring, etc. to supplement traditional computer net-
works, and further stimulates more innovations. In particular, SDN brings opportunities
to network robustness, for example, fine-grained control over network-based security func-
tions; flexibly rerouting traffic bypassing malfunction devices or dropping malicious flows;
and other innovative applications such as protecting web servers from TCP SYN flooding,
etc.3;30;31 Massive research has been exploiting opportunities and innovating promising ap-
plications under SDN architecture; however, the design of SDN itself is conversely exposed
to security challenges. Moreover, a computer network is always coupled with other networks,
and a localized failure might destroy the entire network. It is of great importance to study
network robustness. We define network robustness as the network ability to withstand pos-
sible network failures or attacks; and it ensures network availability, resilience, and adaption
to changing scenarios.
SDN brings opportunities to enhance the computer network’s robustness. First, it pro-
vides better network supervision. The controller has an overview of the entire computer
network and can acquire flow statistics from OpenFlow switches on the fly. Thus, we can
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rapidly identify network failures or attacks. One common application is to identify attack-
ing flow patterns from collected data32;33. Second, SDN allows dynamicality of complex,
network-policy management. Data plane is only responsible for packet forwarding, to avoid
complicated configurations. For example, SDN dynamically routes flows along a middlebox
chain to accomplish network functionalities3;34. These middleboxes help improve network
robustness, e.g., a load balancer is used to circumvent overloads and an IDS is used to de-
tect anomalies. Third, SDN allows elimination of policy conflicts35 and mitigates attacks by
simply programming the OpenFlow controller.
We particularly outline how SDN helps solve the middlebox chain problem. Network
applications require traffic to sequence through multiple types of middleboxes to accomplish
desired network functions. For example, web traffic needs to go through a proxy and then
a firewall36. To fulfill network functions, various types of middleboxes are utilized, and
each type might have a hundred devices in a large network29;37. In traditional computer
networks, traffic steering to meet the above goals is a critical problem23, which might create
false configurations. It is also difficult to dynamically update the routing policy. It is
even more challenging to enable the stateful policy routing (middlebox policy chain) within
limited network resources (network link bandwidth, middlebox-processing capability, and
switch high-speed searching memory).
The problem of routing under middlebox sequence constraints has recently gained re-
markable attention due to the role played by many network devices called middleboxes (e.g.,
firewalls, VPN gateways, proxies, intrusion detection systems (IDS), WAN optimizers) on
network performance38–42. To enforce middlebox policies, a novel middlebox architecture
was presented by Sekar et al. in38. In this paper, the authors designed a network-wide con-
troller and a local coordinator to manage middlebox resources, resembling the architecture
of SDN networks. As a matter of fact, a centralized SDN controller makes a network trans-
parent and synchronous39, as well as more efficient for network administrators to manage.
Furthermore, Joseph et al. proposed a policy-aware switching layer to enforce middlebox
policy and increase middlebox utilization40. They also presented an off-path middlebox de-
ployment. However, under this off-path deployment, flows are often required to travel on one
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link multiple times, increasing the probability of link overload. Fayazbakhsh et al. further
modified legacy middleboxes to support FlowTags used to differentiate flows with different
policy requirements41. Alternatively, OpenFlow allows the identification of stateful policy
flows using available fields in the packet header. Using OpenFlow, Qazi et al. elaborated on
the complexity of selecting middleboxes and scheduling flows, and simplified the middlebox
traffic steering problem by oﬄine pruning some of the less-promising routing paths29. The
proposed oﬄine calculation is time consuming, and it was performed each time failures oc-
curred or policy changed. This aspect is problematic, since networks should quickly respond
toward middlebox/link overloads and failures. In summary, open issues are as follows: how to
select possible routing paths with middlebox policy enforcement, and how to quickly assign
flow routing paths to maintain network performance. In solving middlebox chain problems,
resources on the middleboxes are another constraint. We take on solving these open issues
in chapter 4.
Another topic of research in the field of middlebox management concerns how to deal
with link failures and middlebox failures43–46. Research indicated that middleboxes con-
tribute to 43 percent of high-severity incidents28;46. Thus, it is critical to study middlebox
failures. Existing solutions are either to prevent the effect of middlebox failures before-
hand47, or react after middlebox failures; for example, reconstruct middlebox states after
failures48. However, today’s network relies on sequenced types of middleboxes to provide
network functions, and different types of traffic go through different sequences — both of
these being beyond the scope of existing approaches. Restarting middleboxes is a common
approach to dealing with middlebox failures, but few articles considered the impact during
the restarting period. In addition, when application requirements change, middlebox policy
will be updated. To avoid misconfiguration during policy updates, SDN’s centralized and
programmable management helps solve this middlebox policy routing problem. Therefore,
we are the first to consider middlebox failures in the middlebox chain problem, and then
mitigate these failures’ consequences using SDN. This will be introduced in chapter 4.
As SDN invokes huge interest from both academia and industry, it is rapidly proceeding
from vision to reality. However, some researchers are arguing that SDN conversely brings
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several security threats due to nature of separation between the control plane and the data
plane49–53. It is not clear whether SDN brings more benefits, or conversely, more threats, to
today’s networks.
Several components in SDN architecture are exposed to robustness issues. Attacks might
occur on the application plane, the control plane, the data plane, the northbound interface,
or the southbound interface as shown in Fig. 1.254–61. First, attacks toward the controller
can lead to a disaster for the entire network. Thus, the controller is a particularly attractive
attack target. The controller might be exposed to unauthorized access and exploitation
through open interfaces (northbound and southbound interfaces). Second, when multiple
applications are deployed on the application plane, conflicting flow-rule problems may arise35.
Third, the control plane and the data plane are both exposed to scalability issues. For
example, the controller might be overwhelmed by an excess of flow-entry installation requests
and switches might fail to buffer all new flow packets. This can be exploited by attackers to
launch denial of service attacks.
OpenFlow is an enabler of SDN. In an OpenFlow network, when a packet arrives, a switch
forwards the packet based on the matching flow entry. When no flow entry matches, the
switch will generate a packet-in message to the controller for a flow-entry setup. Assume a
large volume of table-miss packets are coming. The same number of requests will be sent from
the switch to the controller62. Such requests will overwhelm the switch-to-control channel,
exhaust the controller computation resources, and further lead to controller dysfunctionality.
As network size scales or user requirements vary, the controller’s scalability issue will
become more severe. Many efforts have been made to solve this scalability issue. Researchers
proposed use of distributed controllers to decentralize the calculation burden of the single
controller63 and further protect the entire network from the single-point controller failure.
Moreover, some research on wildcard rules is aiming at reducing the number of requests from
the data plane64;65. All those solutions help improve the control plane scalability. They are
also valuable for denial of service (DoS) attack elimination strategies, due to the fact that
control plane scalability issues and control plane DoS attacks are both resource consumption
issues. However, when DoS attacks are launched, those strategies are no longer sufficient.
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To mitigate DoS attacks, we can detect a user with abnormal behaviors by simply setting
a rate-limiting threshold. When a user sends more flows than the threshold, we can block all
flows from that user66. However, those requests could come from legitimate users and simply
blocking all suspicious flows unavoidably affects flows from legitimate users. Moreover, in
the SDN architecture, attackers can generate excessive short new flows to overwhelm the
controller, but absolutely skip rate limiting. In this case, total rate of those attacking flows
is very small, and it’s hard to block the attacks by setting a rate-limiting threshold.
Crafting a huge amount of short table-miss packets forces the switch to inquire the
controller, leading to network dysfunctionalities. Such new table-miss packets’ flooding is
called “request flooding” for short in this dissertation. Many research groups are working
on this topic52;53;62;67–74. Request flooding will lead to switch software components overload,
switch-to-controller channel congestion, switch flow-table overflow, and controller’s resource
saturation71. Among them, controller-resource saturation is destructive to the entire net-
work. Avant-Guard72 and Lineswitch73;74 proposed a proxy-like switch extension to shield
the controller from attacks. Such a method is effective when it comes to TCP-SYN flooding.
We are targeting a more general request flooding, also indicated in53;62;67–71. OF-GUARD53
and Floodguard62 built an additional data plane cache to temporarily hold excessive new
packets to protect the controller. Zhang et al.71 and Wei et al.67 proposed to mitigate this
request-flooding attack from the controller side, instead of adding any extra complexity on
the data plane. Zhang et al. introduced weighted, fair-sharing queues to reduce the packets
from attackers being served71. Wei et al. dynamically maintained a trust list and updated
each user’s trust value to block the attackers67.
Thus, several challenges have arisen, as follows: Will the controller have enough CPUs
and memory to hold queueing lists? Does the controller work to completely block attackers?
How do we differentiate legitimate users from attackers? In this dissertation, we explore
controller vulnerabilities from the attacker’s point of view, and detail an adversary model
and defenses. This will be introduced in chapter 5.
Regarding the robustness of cyber-physical systems, Buldyrev et al. provided a one-
to-one node dependency interdependent network model to describe the cascading failures
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caused by the dependencies between two individual networks18. Cascading failures under
random attack18;75 and targeted attack76;77 were further studied in order to develop suitable
protection strategies. Not only node correlations78 and clustering coefficients within one in-
dividual network79, but also node coupling approaches of the nodes from two networks20;77;80
influence network robustness. Schneider et al. indicated that choosing a fraction of nodes as
autonomous beneficially increased robustness81. Mirzasoleiman et al. introduced weighted
individual networks and studied link-load effects on robustness in82. Results in83–85 com-
prehensively indicated and proved a coupling threshold existed for interconnected network
structural transitions from two independent functioning networks to a whole system. Fur-
ther research in edge attack rather than node attack was produced86. Gao et al. generalized
interdependent networks with two individual networks to n individual networks87. However,
all research is based on the one-to-one node dependency interdependent network model in18.
The one-to-multiple dependency model brought up in88 is more realistic than the one-to-one
node dependency model in previous papers. Reis et al. extended this to study indegree-
indegree and indegree-outdegree relationships, that is, one node can have multiple supports
from another network89. Yag˘an et al. proved that a proper allocation of dependency links in
their one-to-multiple dependency model would contribute to a more robust system90. Their
dependency model is valuable, but in reality, it is always the case that one network has mul-
tiple dependencies from the other network. The numbers of nodes in two individual networks
are not equal as well. Weights of dependency links are no longer identical. In chapter 3, we
build a realistic robust interdependent network model and allocate dependency links to make
the network more robust from cascading failures. With this allocation, we do not expect
localized damage in the computer network to propagate to an uncontrollable disaster for the
entire cyber-physical networks.
In summary, in this dissertation, we are analyzing and solving some challenging issues to




In this chapter, we explore a robust cyber-physical network framework. Interdependent
network models are often used to show how one network has an effect on another network
through their dependencies. We propose a novel interdependent network model, which con-
sists of two individual networks with unequal numbers of nodes and one-to-multiple weighted
dependency links between the two networks. Based on realistic assumptions, this model dif-
fers from previous works that considered equal numbers of nodes in the two networks and
identical under limited budgets. We formulate an optimization problem to allocate depen-
dency links using least resources. This novel model enhances the practicability of traditional
cyber-physical system structures, but it makes the dependency-link deployment problem
more complex and the optimization problem cannot be solved in large networks. To overcome
this problem, we propose a new algorithm based on a revised network flow method. Exten-
sive simulations on random networks and real networks show that our deployment method
produces topologies that are more robust than the ones obtained by other deployment tech-
niques. Results indicate that our algorithm is efficient and cost-effective in designing robust
interdependent networks, and our deployment method is suitable for networks of any size.
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3.1 Interdependent network model
We build a novel network model for cyber-physical systems considering dependencies between
individual networks. First, we introduce interdependent network models. Second, we present
how one network affects the other in the cyber-physical systems. Third, we further discuss
individual network models and their dependencies.
3.1.1 Classic interdependent network model
Buldyrev et al. presented an interdependent model for a blackout in Italy in 200318. They
considered two networks, A and B, with the same number of nodes. Network A is a power
network, and the nodes of network A can be considered as power stations; network B is an
Internet network, and the nodes of network B are internet servers. Functioning of a power
station relies on control information provided by an internet server, and an internet server
needs power supply from a power station. The two networks are one-to-one coupled with
each other and rely on the other to provide critical resources. Connections between two
individual networks are presented by their dependency links.
3.1.2 Realistic interdependent network model
In real-world interdependent networks, a node in a network is often supported by multiple
nodes in another network. A one-to-one node dependency model is no longer suitable for
further interdependent network studies. And, it is always the case that numbers of nodes in
two individual networks are not equal in reality. Our novel interdependent network model
can be considered as one of our contributions. Moreover, costs of allocating dependency
links rely on geographical features, corresponding node loads, etc. Thus, dependency links
should be weighted rather than being assumed equal. Consequently, a one-to-one node-
dependency-link model is not realistic, but one-to-multiple dependency links with various
weights must be studied. Furthermore, dependency-link allocation designs can greatly affect
the robustness (R) of interdependent networks.
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Figure 3.1: Compared with previous models, we build a realistic cyber-physical network
framework with one-to-multiple dependencies, two unequal-size individual networks, and
weighted dependency links.
Our model consists of three parts: two individual networks (A and B) and their de-
pendencies91. Individual network models will be introduced in subsection 3.1.4, and their
dependencies are discussed in subsection 3.1.5. Two nodes in the same individual network
are connected by connected links, while two nodes from different individual networks are in-
terdependent by dependency links. Numbers of nodes in network A and B are denoted by NA
and NB, respectively, and dependency links are weighted. If all dependency links are iden-
tical, we call them non-weighted links or weighted links with weight equal to 1. The largest
component18;88;92, i.e., largest connected subgraph, represents a functioning component in
each individual network. We allow for one-to-multiple dependencies in the interdependent
network, rather than one-to-one dependency. Moreover, NA and NB are not necessarily equal
in our model. The improvement of our model from previous models is shown in Fig. 3.1.
3.1.3 Cascading failures
Cyber-physical systems are more likely to fail because of interdependence between cyber
networks (e.g., computer networks) and physical systems (e.g., power networks). If a power
station fails, the assumption is made that it will no longer supply power to the linked
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computers in computer networks. In addition, other power stations lose connections with
that station and must redistribute their loads. Therefore, we have an assumption that if
some nodes fail, the links (connected links and dependency links) connected to these nodes
fail. Then we obtain several disconnected groups of power stations after failures appearing
in the power network, and assume the largest component in the power network works as the
functioning component, rather than other small connected components88. The same thing
happens in the computer network, that is, we only consider the largest component. The
second assumption is that nodes not in the largest component (of its own network) fail.
Moreover, if no power station supplies power to a computer, the computer will not operate,
and vice versa, leading to the third assumption: nodes with no dependency links fail. N∗A
and N∗B represent the numbers of nodes in two stable networks when cascading failures come










In Fig. 3.2, Ai indicates the i
th node in one network A, while Bj represents the j
th node in
another networkB. The connection between Ai andBj is represented bymij. The connection
between Ai and Aj is represented by aij, and the connection between Bi and Bj is represented
by bij, respectively. In Fig. 3.2a, we see an initial state of the interdependent networks
with one-to-multiple dependencies and unequal numbers of nodes in the two networks. We
consider the initial state in (a) as NA = 5 and NB = 6. In Fig. 3.2b, the initial failure rate
happening to network A is 0.2. It illustrates when A3 is attacked, the connected links a32, a34
and dependency links m33, m34 fail. Nodes A1, A2, A4, and A5 are in the largest component.
Network A influences Network B through m33 and m34. In Fig. 3.2c, B3 has no dependency
links, so B3 fails and the links connected to B3 fail. Node B1 and B2 fail as they become
disconnected from the functioning component of network B. Network B influences Network
A through m11, m12, and m22, as shown in Fig. 3.2d. Fig. 3.2e indicates that A1 and A2 have
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(a) Initial state (b) Initial failure (c) A to B
(d) Largest component in B (e) B to A (f) Stable state
Figure 3.2: A cascading failure process is illustrated.
no dependency links. In Fig. 3.2f, we have a stable state after cascading failures. A4A5 and
B4B5B6 are existing nodes, i.e., N
∗
A = 2 and N
∗
B = 3 at this time. According to Eq. (3.1),
R = 0.5× (2/5 + 3/6) = 0.45. It is noted that robustness (R) in the following simulations is
calculated by Eq. (3.1).
3.1.4 Individual network model
Erdo˝s-Re´nyi (ER)93 and Barabs´i-Albert (BA)94 are both random graph models. In the ER
model, each vertex has the same probability with a fixed number of edges. The BA model
is used to generate random scale-free networks using a preferential attachment mechanism.
It represents some real networks with the feature of containing few nodes (a.k.a., hubs) with
unusually high degree. We use these two typical random network models as the individual
network models to generalize our results. We also apply our strategies with real network
topologies in section 3.7.
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3.1.5 Discussion of dependency links
This work designs how to allocate dependency links with prior information of link weights.
The weights show the differences among dependency links. A larger weight represents a
higher cost to allocate this dependency link. We use a limited budget (total weights: tw) to
build all dependency links. To the author’s best knowledge, this is the first work to apply
the concept of limited budget to arrange dependency links from an engineering perspective.
Link allocation in this work shows how nodes in two individual networks are dependent and
is performed as an extensive study of node coupling75–77. In the following sections, we focus
on designing allocation strategies of dependency links.
3.2 Dependency-link allocation
Our design of dependency-link allocations is divided into the following two steps:
Step 1: Basic connectivity — each node has at least one dependency link with least total
weights.
Step 2: Augmented connectivity — we use the remaining budget to set up additional de-
pendency links.
3.2.1 Problem formulation
In Step 1, each node in one network requires power or information from the node in another
network through dependency links. Therefore, each node in the interdependent networks
should have at least one dependency link in our design. Using least total weights to achieve
basic connectivity becomes an optimization problem. Different weights of dependency links
complicate this problem. We adapt a revised network flow algorithm95 to solve it.
In our model, the numbers of nodes in two networks are unequal. The number of links
should be no less than the larger number of nodes in two networks, so that each node in that
network has one dependency link, while each node in the opposite network has at least one
dependency link. In this chapter, we assume the number of nodes in the right side network
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(NB) is larger than the number of nodes in the left side (NA). Therefore, a total of NB links
is needed to achieve basic connectivity using the least weights. We generally describe the







mij = 1 (3.3)
∑
j
mij ≥ 1 (3.4)
Matrix m is a 0-1 matrix, which means that mij could only equal 0 or 1. If the link
between Ai and Bj is selected, mij is equal to 1. Matrix W is the matrix containing all
dependency-link weights in the network, and Wij represents the weight of edge mij.
3.2.2 Existing tools limitation
Solving the basic connectivity is an optimization problem. However, due to the large numbers
of variables in large networks (e.g., if 1,000 nodes are in each network, 1,000,000 variables
will be in our problem 3.2.1), this problem cannot be solved by traditional tools such as
LINGO or MATLAB.
3.3 Revised network flow algorithm
We revise the network flow algorithm96;97 to solve Step 1. This is another highlight of this
chapter. The new algorithm is the minimum cost maximum flow with lower and upper
bounds (cost flow for abbreviation in the following).
3.3.1 Notations of cost flow
G(V,E) is a finite directed graph in which every edge (u, v) ∈ E has a non-negative, real-
valued capacity c(u, v), lower flow bound c0(u, v), and a real-valued cost p(u, v). If (u, v) 6∈ E,
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we assume that c(u, v) = 0, c0(u, v) = 0, and p(u, v) = 0. The three properties of edge (u, v)
can be written as (c0(u, v), c(u, v); p(u, v)) for simplicity.
3.3.2 Basic constraints in cost flow
Let N = G(V,E) be a network with s, t ∈ V being the source and sink, respectively.
A flow in a flow network is a real function f : V × V → R with the following properties
for all nodes u and v. Notation f(u, v) is the network flow from u to v.
Capacity and lower flow bound constraints: c0(u, v) ≤ f(u, v) ≤ c(u, v). The flow along
an edge is larger than c0 but cannot exceed its capacity c.
Skew symmetry: f(u, v) = −f(v, u). The net flow of link (u, v) must be opposite of the
net flow of (v, u).
Flow conservation:
∑
v∈V f(u, v) = 0, unless u = s or u = t. The net flow of a node is
zero, except for the source, which “produces” flow and the sink which “consumes” flow.
Cost notation: p(u, v) denotes the unit cost of flow from node u to node v, and P (G)
denotes total cost of flow from s to t. Therefore, P (G) =
∑
(u,v)∈E p(u, v)× f(u, v).
3.3.3 Algorithm process
In a basic connectivity problem, we construct the network as follows: for a weight matrix W
with size NA × NB, we build NA nodes denoted by l1 through lNA , and NB nodes denoted
by r1 through rNB . An edge (li, rj) has properties denoted by (0, 1;Wij), which means for
any integer 1 ≤ i ≤ NA and 1 ≤ j ≤ NB, there is an edge between node li and rj, and the
lower flow bound is 0, capacity is 1, and cost is the corresponding value in the weight matrix,
Wij. In addition, we add an edge (s, li) with (1, NB; 0) for every li, and an edge (rj, t) with
(1, 1; 0) for every rj, as shown in Fig. 3.3, and then run the minimum cost maximum flow
algorithm on this network. All these edges are directed edges.
Residual capacity of an edge is denoted by cf (u, v) and cost of this edge is denoted
pf (u, v). If (u, v) ∈ E, then cf (u, v) = c(u, v) − f(u, v), pf (u, v) = p(u, v); cf (v, u) =
f(u, v) − c0(u, v), pf (v, u) = −p(u, v). These edges construct a residual network denoted
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Figure 3.3: Cost flow algorithm. Three properties are on each link, denoted by (c0, c; p).
The leftmost node is the source (s), and the rightmost node is the sink (t). The NA nodes
l1, l2, · · · , lNA and the NB nodes r1, r2, · · · , rNB represent NA rows and NB columns in matrix
W , respectively.
Gf (V,Ef ), representing the amount of available capacity. This residual network is a new
directed network compared to the original network with two properties on each edge: residual
capacity and cost. Augmenting is expected to happen in this residual network. A path can
be observed from u to v in the residual network, even though no path is evident from u to
v in the original network. If (u, v) ∈ E, we point out p(v, u) = 0 in the original network;
however, we have pf (v, u) = −p(u, v) in the new network. Since flows in opposite directions
cancel out, decreasing the flow from v to u and increasing the flow from u to v are identical.
An augmenting cycle is a negative-weight cycle in the residual network. Weight in the
network is the cost; sending flow around the cycle strictly decreases total cost and preserves
feasibility. A feasible flow f is optimal if and only if there are no augmenting cycles.
In a regular minimum cost maximum flow problem, first we should find maximum flow
with a feasible solution, and then find an augmenting cycle in order to identify minimum
cost. However, in this problem, all edges from rj to t are identical; every edge has both
lower bound and capacity equal to 1. Consequently, f(rj, t) is equal to 1 for any j, and
thus maximum flow of this network is NB. Therefore, the procedure of finding maximum
flow is unnecessary. By initially setting any feasible flow and finding an augmenting cycle
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repeatedly, minimum cost can finally be found. A negative-weight cycle can be found by
utilizing a shortest-path algorithm, for example, shortest path faster algorithm (SPFA).
3.3.4 Relationship between flow graph and link selection
We propose this cost flow algorithm to solve the following problem: in a bipartite graph, we
select the minimum number of links (equal to NB), such that all nodes are covered and have
the minimum total weights. Every feasible flow in the graph corresponds one-to-one to a set
of links, which satisfy the constraints in Eq. (3.2), (3.3), and (3.4).
(a) The basic connectivity (b) Uniform distribution (c) Random distribution
(d) An example of weighted net-
works
(e) Another weighted networks
Figure 3.4: Non-weighted link and weighted link allocation example. Specifically, dependency
links, in Fig. 3.4d and 3.4e, are allocated according to matrices Wnon−weighted and Wweighted,
respectively.
The capacity of link (rj, t) is 1, which means that at most one node can provide node rj
one unit of flow. Also, the lower bound is 1, which means node rj needs at least one unit
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of flow. These two constraints guarantee that node rj will acquire exactly 1 unit of flow;
therefore, the constraint in Eq. (3.3) is guaranteed.
Similarly, the capacity and lower bound of link (s, li) guarantee the constraint in Eq.
(3.4).
Matrix f can be any feasible flow matrix, and the selection of f does not influence the
final result; it is only an initial guess. The initial guess of f in our simulation is:
Algorithm 1 Cost Flow
Input: W (NA ×NB matrix)
Output: f (0-1 Matrix)
1: function MinCostMaxFlow(W )
2: p←

01×1 01×NA 01×NB 01×1
0NA×1 0 W 0
0NB×1 0 0 0




01×1 ∞1×NA 01×NB 01×1
0NA×1 0 1 0
0NB×1 0 0 1




01×1 11×NA 01×NB 01×1
0NA×1 0 0 0
0NB×1 0 0 1
01×1 0 0 0

5: f ← any matrix that is a feasible initial flow
6: while true do
7: Dis← 0 with the same size as p
8: for all i, j do
9: if fij < cij then Disij ← pij
10: if fij > c0ij then Disji ← −pij
11: end for
12: Cycle←SPFA(Dis) . Use SPFA algorithm to find negative cycle.
13: if Cycle not found then return f
14: for each edge (u, v) on the cycle do
15: fuv ← fuv + 1







01×1 K 01×NB 01×1
0NA×1 0 D 0
0NB×1 0 0 1








1 0 · · · 0 0 · · · 0







0 0 · · · 1 1 · · · 1

3.4 Dependency-link allocation example under limited
budget
We use an example to describe various strategies of non-weighted link and weighted link
allocations as shown in Fig. 3.4. In Fig. 3.4, blue links are allocated in basic connectivity
and yellow links show augmented connectivity by utilizing the remaining budget. Fig. 3.4a
shows the basic connectivity.
3.4.1 Parameters of the example
Here, we have parameters tw = 8, NA = 4, NB = 5.
Wnon−weighted =

1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1





1 2 2 2 2
2 1 1 2 2
2 2 1 1 2
2 1 2 1 1

3.4.2 Adding non-weighted links
Comparing Fig. 3.4b and Fig. 3.4c, the numbers of dependency links are identical using
the limited budget, while distributions of these links differ. We offer simulation results and
analysis on different distributions of links in section 3.5.
3.4.3 Adding weighted links
With matrix Wweighted, we compare various sequences of dependency-links allocation in
Fig. 3.4d and Fig. 3.4e, resulting in different numbers of links using an equal limited budget.
We discuss the sequence of allocating dependency links and analyze simulation results in
section 3.6.
3.5 Non-weighted dependency-link model simulation
and comparison
Non-weighted dependency links, which can be assumed as links with the same weight 1, can
largely simplify the Step 1 talked about in section 3.2. In Step 2, considering the remaining
budget, no matter which links are selected, the number of links is equal because of the
identical weight of all links. However, the network robustness differs based on its deployment.
Many studies have indicated that node degree distribution is critical for robustness in the
interdependent networks. The aim of augmented connectivity is to achieve minimum variance
of node degrees, referred to as uniform distribution deployment in Fig. 3.4b. Also, instead of
adding links in this pattern, randomly adding additional links, known as random distribution
deployment, is shown in Fig. 3.4c.
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We apply ER networks to generate the topologies of two individual networks; however,
ER networks generated in each run in the simulation are not identical. Due to the stochastic
nature of ER networks, we simulate multiple times in order to obtain the average performance
of both deployment methods. The relationship between numbers of nodes in two individual
networks is formulated as NB = (1 + α) × NA. Therefore, node numbers NA and NB have
identical magnitude and ratio, making simulation results comparable. These descriptions
are also suitable for the weighted model in section 3.6.
Two non-weighted dependency-link deployments are simulated in Fig. 3.5a and Fig. 3.5b.
In these two distributions, we have the same average node degree. Also, in the basic con-
nectivity, we guarantee every node is connected to at least one node on the other side (left
side or right side). However, performances of these two distributions are not identical. The
simulations indicate uniform distribution is more robust than random distribution, as shown
in Fig. 3.5a and Fig. 3.5b. In81, the authors indicated similar conclusions under equal num-
bers of nodes in two networks. Our simulation results can be considered as the extensions
of results in81.
In Fig. 3.5c, each line represents a number of nodes (NA). Every line shows the rela-
tionship between initial failure rate and robustness (R), where we use uniform distribution
deployment. Simulation results show a threshold of the sharp decrease is between 0.4 and
0.5. We call this threshold critical failure rate (pc). The sharp decrease of robustness will
be the focus of further study. When initial failure rate is larger than 0.5, networks are very
likely to be completely destroyed.
3.6 Weighted dependency-link model simulation and
comparison
The concept of limited budget is first introduced by us from engineering perspectives. Given
the limited budget of dependency-links deployment, how to design the links’ deployment? We
have discussed how to allocate weighted dependency links using least total weights to achieve
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(a) The R of two strategies at different NAs (b) The R of two strategies at different initial
failure rates
(c) Each NA’s corresponding R at different initial failure
rates
Figure 3.5: Non-weighted networks comparisons.
basic connectivity in section 3.3. From a traditional viewpoint, maximizing the number of
dependency links always performs better statistically in the case where the dependency-link
weight distribution is independent of the structures of the two individual networks. Maximiz-
ing the number of dependency links in Step 2 might give us more robustness. Maximizing the
number of dependency links deployment and randomly adding dependency links deployment
are included in our comparison.
In randomly choosing deployment, if we choose links randomly from the beginning, a
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majority of nodes will not have a dependency link. This is not fair to random distribution.
Therefore, we implement the random selection algorithm after the basic connectivity. We
solve the basic connectivity by first using a revised network flow algorithm and then compare
robustness of the maximum number of link model and random links deployment model with
a limited budget. After the optimal allocation of dependency links in Step 1 is realized
by the revised network flow algorithm, we need to allocate additional links in augmented
connectivity using the remaining weights. There are two ways to realize Step 2.
3.6.1 Maximizing the number of dependency links
To maximize the number of links according to the greedy algorithm, the least weight link
should be added until the budget has been achieved. We sort weights using an unstable
sorting algorithm, quick sort, to make the process efficient and random98. For the purpose
of this study, “random” can be illustrated by saying if we have 5 units of budget left, but
we have 10 links with weight 1 to choose from, we should choose 5 links from 10 randomly,
instead of selecting links from left to right, up to down in the matrix.
∑
i,j
mij ×Wij ≤ cb
3.6.2 Randomly choosing dependency links
Randomly (with equal probability) let mij = 1
∑
i,j
mij ×Wij ≤ cb
In regular random selection, k items should be picked up from n items; however, in this
problem, we have a budget and we must guarantee the chosen links do not exceed the budget
limit; therefore, how many links will be chosen is unknown in advance. When we pick up
a link with a weight larger than the remaining budget, we cannot simply discard that link
and randomly choose another link, because this is very likely to happen when the remaining
34
budget is low, and therefore the process will be very time-consuming. Consequently, we
design a more efficient algorithm for the random deployment problem. Our algorithm is
shown in Algorithm 2. Since our algorithm is exactly the same as the naive algorithm until
the remaining budget decreases to a number that is less than C, we will focus on the algorithm
complexity analysis when the remaining budget is less than C. In the simulation, elements
in the weight matrix follow the uniform distribution U{1, C}. Our algorithm is polynomial
with the complexity of O(N lgN), where N = NA × NB; while the naive algorithm is a
pseudo-polynomial algorithm with the complexity of O(C).
Algorithm 2 Randomly Choosing Edges
Input: W (NA ×NB matrix), cb
Output: ch (0-1 Matrix)
1: function RandomChoose(W )
2: ch←MinCostMaxFlow(W )
3: Create array s whose element is {int,int,int}
4: for all i, j do
5: if fij = 1 then cb← cb− pij
6: else if pij 6= 0 then s.append({i, j, pij})
7: end for
8: sort s by the third dimension
9: k ← s.size
10: chosen[1..k] = 0
11: while k > 0 do
12: r ← random int from 1 to k
13: if cb > s[r].third && chosen[r] = 0 then
14: cb← cb− s[r].third
15: choosen[r] = 1
16: else
17: k ← r − 1
18: end while
19: for all i in chosen do
20: if chosen[i] = 1 then





(a) The R of two strategies at different NAs (b) The R of two strategies at different initial
failure rates
(c) Each NA’s corresponding R at different initial failure
rates
Figure 3.6: Weighted networks comparisons.
3.6.3 Comparison
We obtain an adjacency matrix of dependency links between nodes from two networks based
on Step 1 and Step 2. Results of maximizing the number of links deployment show more
robust than results obtained by randomly choosing deployment, as shown in Fig. 3.6a and
Fig. 3.6b. Results indicate that various designs of weighted dependency links greatly affect
network robustness.
Similar to Fig. 3.5c, Fig. 3.6c illustrates the relationship between failure rate and robust-
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(a) NA = 300 and NB = 404 (b) NA = 300 and NB = 754
(c) NA = 300 and NB = 828 (d) NA = 300 and NB = 1085
(e) NA = 300 and NB = 1191
Figure 3.7: Models simulations in real topologies.
ness. We use a maximizing number of links deployment in the simulation. Zigzag occurs
due to randomness of simulation, but a falling trend can be observed in every line. Critical
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failure rate pc resides between 0.25 and 0.35, at which point the curves have a sharp decrease.
3.7 Extensive simulations on real network topologies
and Baraba´si-Albert networks
We have applied ER network topologies into previous simulations, thereby achieving mean-
ingful results regarding allocations of dependency links. Strategies now need to be applied
into our simulations with real network topologies in order to achieve the acceptability of our
design.
3.7.1 Real network topology simulation and comparison
In the simulation, we use the IEEE 300-bus system as the power network topology, which
is obtained from a power systems test case archive99. Computer network topologies are
obtained from Caida100 and Topology Zoo101. Dependency-link weights are generated in a
uniform distribution. Here, we should notice that real dependency-link weights are affected
by various factors, and exact data cannot be obtained by simply measuring and calculating.
For research purposes, studying mathematical models to achieve the estimated weight matrix
is an open issue, which is beyond the scope of our work.
With real network topology of two individual networks, the robustness of maximizing the
number of links deployment is greater than the robustness of randomly choosing deployment
as shown in Fig. 3.7. The simulation results coincide with previous simulation results with
ER networks. However, the curves of real topologies in Fig. 3.7 decrease more sharply than
those with ER topologies. The pc of real network topology is less than the pc of ER network
topology because of different node-degree distributions of two networks as shown in Fig. 3.8.
Versatility and conciseness are the primary advantages of ER network topology. Simu-
lations on ER networks show which deployment of interdependent networks is more robust.
Robustness simulation results based on ER networks are fit with results based on real topolo-
gies. Furthermore, the existence of pc is shown in the simulation results. This rate is critical
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to the protection of interdependent networks, because it gives us a threshold, under which
the fraction of nodes failed can be tolerated. Thus, a proper model equals the meaning of
millions of real data simulations.















Node Degree Distribution on E−R Network
(a) The R of two strategies at different NAs




















Node Degree Distribution on Real Network Topology
(b) The R of two strategies at different initial
failure rates
Figure 3.8: Different degree distributions.
3.7.2 Dependency-link allocation on Baraba´si-Albert networks
Discovering an optimal solution to Step 2 for both weighted and non-weighted dependency
links is in general challenging. To achieve more results, we explore more strategies on non-
weighed dependency link design. Here, we extend network topologies from ER networks to
Baraba´si-Albert networks, and protect the hubs by assigning them more dependency links.
We call this method protecting hubs deployment.
We simulate and compare random distribution deployment, uniform distribution deploy-
ment, and protecting hubs deployment with Baraba´si-Albert networks as the two individual
networks.
Hub failures always break a single network into several small components. In the inter-
dependent networks, if we assign more dependency links to the hubs of network A, the hubs
always have dependency links survivable from the dependent nodes failing in network B, and
won’t fail easily. Consequently, network A will be protected from breaking into several small
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components. However, less dependency links will be assigned to non-hubs due to a limited
budget. Now, we consider a case where the average number of dependency links is two for a
node in network B. When we assign more dependency links to the hubs, many non-hubs will
have only one dependency link, and they are at highly vulnerable states. Therefore, this new
protecting hubs deployment might not perform as well as the first two deployments. Fig. 3.9
indicates uniform distribution deployment has better performance, which is coincident with
our analysis.
(a) The R of three strategies at different NAs (b) The R of three strategies at different initial
failure rates
Figure 3.9: Three deployments within Baraba´si-Albert networks.
3.8 Contributions
In this chapter, we explore a more robust cyber-physical network framework. First, we
design a more realistic interdependent network model and demonstrate its cascading failure’s
process. Second, we allocate dependency links to make networks more robust, and we adapt
a revised network flow algorithm to solve this dependency-link allocation problem. Third,
we conduct extensive simulations on different network topologies to validate the effectiveness
of our deployment methods.
Our contributions are listed as follows:
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1. We propose a realistic cyber-physical network framework with one-to-multiple dependen-
cies, two unequal-size individual networks, and a weighted dependency link.
2. We deploy dependency links under a limited budget to obtain more robustness.
3. We adapt a revised network flow algorithm to obtain a basic network structure.
4. We conduct extensive simulations on different dependency-link deployments and individ-




Middlebox policy enforcement using
SDN
Network applications require traffic to sequence through multiple types of middleboxes to
enhance network functionalities, e.g., load balancers are used to circumvent overloads and
IDSes are used to detect anomalies. Sequenced-middlebox policy routing on top of regu-
lar layer 2/3 flow routing is challenging to be flexibly managed by network administrators.
In addition, various types of middlebox resources concurrently obtained by numerous ap-
plications complicate network-resource management. Fortunately, SDN helps solve these
problems flexibly. Because of the existence of redundancy in the network, effects of mid-
dlebox failures could be eliminated if we are able to quickly reroute those affected flows to
middleboxes with enough processing capabilities. Therefore, the challenge is to find such
backup middlebox and reroute flows quickly when a middlebox failure occurs. SDN also
helps quickly identify the failures and find alternative paths in order to minimize failure
effects. In this chapter, we develop a global load-balancing routing approach and a local
rerouting approach to handle different scenarios in the middlebox chain problem using SDN.
42
4.1 Middlebox policy enforcement problem
4.1.1 Problem statement
We are aiming at solving open issues in the middlebox chain problem. First, we propose
a candidate-path generation method to quickly select possible flow-routing paths. Second,
we propose to consider middlebox resources as one of the constraints in the middlebox
chain problem. Third, we are seeking to improve network performances with constraints of
numerous limited network resources. Fourth, the network can quickly respond to network
failures and changes.
4.1.2 Candidate paths generation
Candidate paths are used to balance network loads. We propose a set of routing paths
called “middlebox-by-middlebox shortest routing paths” (m-by-m routing paths) to simplify
candidate-path selection. When the middlebox policy is specified by network administrators,
candidate paths are determined. Mi denotes the set of the ith type middleboxes, e.g., fire-
walls, and |Mi| denotes the number of middleboxes of the type i. A middlebox policy chain
is “Source → M1 → M2 → ... → Mn → Destination.” Each candidate path is determined
by finding the shortest path to or from each middlebox: Source → M1, M1 → M2, ..., and
Mn → Destination. An example is shown in Fig. 4.1. There is a directed demand from S1
to S6 with the logical policy “S1 → firewall → intrusion detection system → S6.” Step 1 is
to find the shortest path from S1 to FW1 (or FW2). Step 2 is determination of the shortest
path from FW1 (or FW2) to IDS. Step 3 is to find the shortest path from IDS to S6.
Since there are two firewalls and one IDS, there will be at least two candidate paths for the
demand “S1 → S6” to route along. To be more general, if there are |MFW | firewalls and
|MIDS| IDSes, and the flow must go through a firewall then an IDS, there will be at least
|MFW | × |MIDS| possible paths for this flow to choose from.
We show three different m-by-m routing paths in Table 4.1. The difference between path
a and path b is a different firewall selection; the difference between path b and path c is a
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Table 4.1: Routing path (S1 → Firewall → IDS → S6)
Path
Step
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
a S1 S2 S5 S8 FW1 S8 S5 IDS S5 S4 S6
b S1 S3 FW2 S3 S6 S4 S5 IDS S5 S4 S6
c S1 S3 FW2 S3 S1 S2 S5 IDS S5 S4 S6
different shortest-path selection among multiple shortest paths.
We propose the m-by-m routing paths as candidate paths for the following reasons:
1. The m-by-m approach allows the simple generation of many candidate paths, and one of
them will be chosen by the centralized controller to achieve network load balancing. On
the chosen path, we can easily record link loads and middlebox loads. Therefore, we are
able to balance link and middlebox loads at the same time.
2. To avoid network congestion, the flows may be routed through a longer m-by-m shortest
path. However, within a certain step, the shortest path is always chosen to save network
resources.
3. Using this approach, flow-level routing can largely reduce the number of flow entries
Figure 4.1: Middlebox-by-middlebox shortest paths.
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installed on each switch, compared with flow-splitting routing.
4. The m-by-m approach can reduce congestion on a middlebox. Considering a routing ex-
ample with the policy “Source→ Firewall→ Destination,” the directed pairwise demand
list is {S1 → S5 : 10Mbps, S6 → S5 : 10Mbps, S7 → S5 : 10Mbps, S8 → S5 : 10Mbps},
shown in Fig. 4.2. FW1 will be overloaded if all flows choose the sequenced, shortest
source-destination path (SP routing approach). We use m-by-m shortest paths instead,
with which a middlebox of the same type (FW2) can help reduce congestion on the highly
used middlebox FW1 (because it is connected with a high-betweenness switch S2).
Figure 4.2: Middlebox overloaded example.
4.2 Global load-balancing routing
In the middlebox policy routing problem, we need to achieve network load balancing not
only on the links but also on the middleboxes. In this part, we formulate a mixed-integer
linear programming (MILP) problem to describe the network102 and accomplish our goal,
given the set of candidate paths. We call this global load-balancing routing approach (global
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LB approach). Considering multiple network-resource constraints to globally make routing
decisions is one of our contributions in this chapter.
4.2.1 Notations
Traffic matrix Dt represents demands of traffic types t, t ∈ T . Each traffic type has a dif-
ferent policy requirement. For example, traffic matrix D1 represents HTTP traffic demands,
which need to route through a firewall middlebox then an IDS middlebox; traffic matrix D2
represents all other traffic demands, which need to route through a firewall middlebox only.
Traffic demands are directed pairwise demands. Pd denotes the set of candidate paths for
a given pairwise demand d. Given a network topology, E denotes the set of links and M
denotes the set of middleboxes. The cardinality of a set is denoted by | |. For example, |Dt|
denotes the number of demand pairs of a traffic type t.
Constants:
ntdpe : the number of times link e occurs in path p of demand pair d of traffic type t.
δtdpm : 1 if middlebox m belongs to path p of demand pair d of traffic type t; 0, otherwise.
htd : volume of demand pair d of traffic type t.
ce : capacity of link e.
cm : capacity of middlebox m.
Variables:
xtdp : flow allocated to path p of demand pair d of traffic matrix t.
utdp : binary variable associated with xtdp.
θe : utilization of link e.
θm : utilization of middlebox m.
θ : maximum utilization of links and middleboxes.
4.2.2 Formulations
The demand satisfaction constraints are shown in Eq. 4.1. From the candidate paths, if we
choose path p to route the flow, the corresponding binary variable utdp equals 1; otherwise 0.
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The demand volume can be routed on only one path out of all the candidate paths, shown in
Eq. 4.2. Here, Eqs. 4.3 and 4.4 represent link-capacity constraints and middlebox-capacity
constraints, respectively. We use the variable θ to constrain link and middlebox utilization.
Both link and middlebox utilizations should be no greater than 1. The goal is to minimize
the maximum link or middlebox utilization, therefore achieving network load balancing. We




xtdp = htdutdp, t ∈ T, d ∈ Dt, p ∈ Pd. (4.1)∑
p














δtdpmxtdp ≤ θmcm,m ∈M. (4.4)
θe ≤ θ ≤ 1, e ∈ E. (4.5)
θm ≤ θ ≤ 1,m ∈M. (4.6)
We substitute xtdp by htdutdp using Eq. 4.1, which largely reduces the number of vari-
ables and simplifies P1. Also, we can directly use variable θ, so the variables θe and θm are























δtdpmutdp ≤ θcm,m ∈M. (4.9)
4.2.3 Other use cases
Today, computer network demands are increasing dramatically, so network resources are
limited. Our LB routing approach improves network performance by balancing all network
loads. Our approach relies on the accuracy of estimated traffic demands, which can be
guaranteed using the approaches in103–105. By minimizing the maximum utilization, the
approach is effective to balance all network resources well.
Other network features (cost, delay, congestion, etc.) can also be formulation objectives.
We can slightly modify the load-balancing formulation to meet the new requirements. For
example, we formulate a problem P3 to minimize network cost in a simplified case of a single
traffic type. ye denotes the load of link e. ym denotes the load of middlebox m. ξe represents









xdp = hdudp, d ∈ D, p ∈ Pd. (4.10)∑
p





ndpexdp = ye, e ∈ E. (4.12)




δdpmxdp = ym,m ∈M. (4.14)
ym ≤ cm,m ∈M. (4.15)
4.2.4 Complexity analysis
P2 is formulated as an MILP problem. It’s challenging for the controller to make routing
decisions in a short time, when the network is large and the topology or policy is updated.
We will illustrate how to solve this problem in section 4.3.
For the complexity of management, we have an estimation of the number of flow entries.
Upper bounds of the number of flow entries on each switch in the simplified case of a single
traffic type: |D|(|Len|+1)
#switch
. |Len| denotes the number of distinct types of middleboxes in
the middlebox policy sequence of that single traffic type.  represents the diameter of the
network. #switch indicates the number of switches in the network.
4.3 Solutions of the global load-balancing routing
We are going to solve the load-balancing optimization problem in this section. First, we
use the branch-and-bound algorithm (BBA)102 to find the optimal solution of this problem.
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i |Mi|)|Dt| possible combinations of variables.
Though BBA is an optimized algorithm, running time grows exponentially with the number
of variables. Therefore, the problem cannot be solved by BBA in a large network. Then,
we use the simulated annealing algorithm (SAN)102 to obtain near-optimal solutions in a
faster way, and then compare the results acquired from BBA and SAN algorithms in sub-
section 4.3.3.
4.3.1 Branch-and-bound algorithm
We apply BBA to solve this optimization problem, shown in Algorithm 3. BBA is a search
algorithm designated for discrete optimization problems, and it gives us the optimal solution
much faster than a brute-force approach.
Here we are applying BBA to a binary integer programming problem, so each binary
variable has two branches. Function SOLUTION(NU ,N0,N1) returns the optimal solution
θ∗ and the corresponding variable vector u of the relaxed LP subproblem. The following
constraints hold:
0 ≤ uj ≤ 1(continuous) for j ∈ NU
uj = 0 for j ∈ N0
uj = 1 for j ∈ N1
However, because of the searching nature of BBA, its execution time is, in general, as
exponential as the number of binary variables. If we have X binary variables and function
SOLUTION runs in O(S) time, the worst-case, overall running time is O(2XS). It is far
beyond our computing capability when it comes to a larger network.
4.3.2 Simulated annealing algorithm
We also apply the SAN algorithm as a substitute for the BBA. The algorithm is shown in
Algorithm 4. SAN is a general optimization technique for solving combinatorial optimization
problems, based on randomization techniques106. SAN is a heuristic algorithm and gives us
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Algorithm 3 Branch-and-Bound Algorithm (BBA)
Input: NU , N0, N1
Output: θbestBBA
1: function BBA(NU , N0, N1)
2: θ, u←solution(NU ,N0,N1)
3: if NU = ∅ or ∀i ∈ U , ui are binary then
4: if θ < θbestBBA then
5: θbestBBA ← θ
6: ubest ← u
7: else
8: if θ ≥ θbestBBA then return . Bounding
9: else . Branching
10: Choose i ∈ NU such that ui is fractional
11: BBA(NU\{i},N0 ∪ {i}, N1)
12: BBA(NU\{i},N0, N1 ∪ {i})
13: end function
an acceptably good solution; and, moreover, it is much faster than search-based algorithms.
The realization of SAN is very straightforward. Our stopping criterion is either the outer
loop counter reaches K (in our case K = 1000), or θSAN haven’t updated for 10 outer
loops. Initial temperature T 0 represents the ability of jumping out of a local minimum of
the algorithm. We reduce the temperature every L inner loops. L = 200.
Since in our algorithm, running time of computing F (x) is O((|E|+ |M |)X), where X is
the number of binary variables, the worst-case overall running time of SAN is O(KL(|E|+
|M |)X).
4.3.3 Algorithm test and comparison
We test the running time of these two algorithms as the number of binary variables increases.
Our test topology is shown in Fig. 4.3. There are two types of traffic: one is HTTP traffic,
which needs to route through a firewall then an IDS; the second is OTHER traffic, which
needs to route through a firewall only. The number of binary variables utdps is related to the
number of demand pairs, and the number of candidate paths of each demand pair. In the
matrix of HTTP traffic, there are five demand pairs, and each demand pair has four candidate
paths; while in the matrix of OTHER traffic, there are two demand pairs, and each demand
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Algorithm 4 Simulated Annealing (SAN) Algorithm
Input: A feasible solution x, T ← T 0 and L
Output: θSAN
1: xbest ← x, θSAN ← F (xbest)
2: while stopping criterion not true do
3: l← 0
4: while l < L do
5: z ← random neighbor(N(x))
6: ∆θ ← F (z)− F (x)
7: if ∆θ ≤ 0 then
8: x← z
9: if F (x) < θSAN then
10: θSAN ← F (x), xbest ← x
11: else if random(0, 1) < e−∆θ/T then
12: x← z
13: l← l + 1
14: end while
15: reduce temperature(T )
16: end while
pair has two candidate paths. The number of binary variables is “5×4+2×2 = 24.” We get
a group of test cases by increasing the number of demand pairs. The number of combinations
of variables is calculated based on the expression at the beginning of this section. We keep
Figure 4.3: SAN and BBA test network
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Table 4.2: Test cases and results
Results
Test Case
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Binary variables 24 26 28 30 32 34 42 46
Combinations of Variables 4,096 8,192 16,384 32,768 65,536 131,072 2,097,152 8,388,608
Running Time Ratio (BBA / SAN) 88 157 876 974 1,534 2,109 12,884 23,891
θbestBBA 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85
θSAN 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85
the total traffic volume in the network identical for all eight test cases. Test results are listed
in Table 4.2. We have two observations from the results:
1. The ratio is defined as the BBA algorithm’s actual running time divided by the SAN
algorithm’s actual running time. The ratio grows exponentially as the number of variables
increases.
2. The SAN algorithm can always achieve a near-optimal solution. Specifically, the SAN
algorithm can achieve the optimal solution θ in all eight test cases.
4.4 Evaluation of our global load-balancing routing on
a Mininet testbed
In this section, we implement our global LB approach using OpenFlow on a Mininet testbed,
and evaluate its effectiveness, compared with SP routing. We use the topology shown in
Fig. 4.4, where the number of middleboxes is comparable to the number of nodes38 107.
The m-by-m approach provides several choices of paths to balance network link and
middlebox utilization. Each flow is assigned to only one candidate path according to the
LB optimization problem, and all candidate m-by-m shortest routing paths are evaluated
and stored at the same time. Flow entries on the switches are installed by the centralized
POX controller. ‘Iperf’ is used to generate traffic at constant rates and measure network
performances. Normalized throughput is defined as the ratio of received packets over sent
53
packets, that are given by ‘Iperf’. End-to-end latency is measured by sending ICMP packets
in addition to the regular traffic.
4.4.1 Experiment setup
In our test, there are two types of traffic: HTTP and OTHER traffic, as described in
subsection 4.2.1. Here we use traffic destined to port 5001 to denote ‘HTTP’ traffic, and port
5002 to denote ‘OTHER’ traffic. We test our approach with homogeneous and heterogeneous
traffic matrices. The homogeneous traffic matrix is a demand matrix where all directed
pairwise traffic demands are identical, and the data rate of each pair ranges from 1.5Mbps
to 3.6Mbps. We have a total of 182 directed pairwise traffic demands. Heterogeneous traffic
matrix means all but one outgoing traffic from a source node have identical data rates, and
the exceptional one has a much higher data rate than the others. The exceptional node is
chosen at random for each source node. For both homogeneous and heterogeneous matrices,
it is the case that half of the traffic is HTTP traffic, and the other half is OTHER traffic.
Link capacity is 115.0 Mbps and middlebox capacity is 93.0 Mbps. For end-to-end latency
measurement, during each 10-second trial of regular traffic, default size ICMP packets with
Figure 4.4: Test topology
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an interval of 50 ms are injected between seconds 8 and 9, so that the network has an
opportunity to stabilize. An average of 50 independent trials is used for each total traffic
volume.
4.4.2 Observations from experiment results
Figure 4.5: Evaluation of global LB routing
In Fig. 4.5, our global LB routing achieves almost the highest normalized throughput,
when the total traffic volume equals 546.0 Mbps. At this point, network utilization is 1.
When total traffic volume exceeds 546.0 Mbps, network resources are no longer sufficient to
accommodate all flows and the normalized throughput decreases. Our LB approach shows
an increase up to 26.4 percent on the throughput, when compared with the SP approach
discussed in subsection 4.1.2. Throughput varies little between homogeneous traffic and
heterogeneous traffic in both approaches. We also measure overall packet losses. Since
results of normalized throughput and normalized packet losses are complementary, we don’t
show results of overall packet loss.
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In Fig. 4.6, end-to-end latency and loss rate from node 1 to node 14 are shown as total
traffic increases. Node 1 to node 14 is a representative node pair, and the shortest path
between them is the diameter of the test topology. When total traffic volume is between 273
Mbps and 546 Mbps, network resources are relatively sufficient for each demand pair, and
the LB approach achieves much lower end-to-end latency and loss rate than the SP routing.
When the total traffic volume is greater than 546 Mbps, there is a bottleneck link on all
possible paths from node 1 to node 14, i.e., both LB approach and SP routing are running
on a congested network. Though the network is congested, the LB approach tries to balance
the traffic so each flow is on a less congested path, while SP routing leads to very congested
paths. This is the reason why the LB approach achieves lower end-to-end loss rate than SP
routing. As expected, latency for any paths which are not shortest, including those of the
LB approach, is greater than SP routing when the entire network becomes fully congested
(the total traffic exceeds 546 Mbps), as shown in Fig 4.6.
4.5 Fast local rerouting
When there are long-term changes, recalculating routing paths of the entire network is
unavoidable but should be done quickly. When there is a transient disturbance (temporary
failure) on the network, we can centrally recalculate the MILP problem according to the
working subnetwork (global LB approach). However, this process takes more time and
forces the unaffected flows to reroute. Consequently, it increases the delay, packet loss, and
use of network resources. Therefore, the entire network recalculation is not a good way to
handle the transient disturbance. We have already evaluated the efficiency of solving the
MILP problem when dealing with long-term network changes in the previous section. In this
section, we design a local rerouting strategy to deal with network transient disturbance. With
regard to the transient disturbance, a redundant backup path is used until the disturbance
has ended.
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Figure 4.6: End-to-end latency and loss rate
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Table 4.3: Alternative paths (S1 → FW → IDS → S2 with the topology in Fig. 4.3)
Virtual path Physical path
Path 1 S1 → FW1 → IDS1 → S2 S1 → S2 → S5 → FW1 → S5 → S2 → IDS1 → S2
Path 2 S1 → FW1 → IDS2 → S2 S1 → S2 → S5 → FW1 → S5 → S3 → IDS2 → S3 → S1 → S2
Path 3 S1 → FW2 → IDS1 → S2 S1 → S3 → S4 → FW2 → S4 → S5 → S2 → IDS1 → S2
Path 4 S1 → FW2 → IDS2 → S2 S1 → S3 → S4 → FW2 → S4 → S3 → IDS2 → S3 → S1 → S2
4.5.1 Middlebox failures
Network failures may happen on links, switches, or middleboxes. Link and switch failures are
mostly studied; therefore, we only consider failures on middleboxes. We call the flows affected
by the failures “affected flows,” while flows not affected by the failures are called “unaffected
flows.” Middlebox failures belong to the transient disturbance, since one of the approaches
of handling a middlebox failure is to restart it28. We propose a fast-recovery mechanism to
handle middlebox failures by rerouting the affected flows during the restarting period. More
importantly, this mechanism is realized locally, and therefore does not disturb the unaffected
flows. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work to handle failures in middlebox
chain scenarios using OpenFlow.
4.5.2 Backup middlebox selection
Let’s look at the example in Table 4.3, which lists all the candidate paths. These paths are
saved before failures by solving the MILP, and thus we can find alternative paths immediately
when there are failures on the middleboxes. For example, path 1 is chosen for routing a
directed demand from S1 to S2 when no failures occur. If FW1 fails, paths 3 and 4 can be
the alternative paths. The challenge is to quickly check whether the alternative path has
enough resources to accommodate the affected flows.
4.5.3 Rerouting strategy analysis
We next consider a network scenario in which one middlebox fails. Flows processed by this
middlebox lose some functionality and need to be routed through another middlebox with
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equivalent functionality during the restarting period. We work on finding a rerouting mech-
anism to achieve higher speed and better performances toward failures without focusing on
the routing path update process. The process is referred to as the network convergence pro-
cess, during which the network responds to the failures and network performance decreases.
Routing paths will come back to the original states when the failed middlebox resumes work
after restarting. To not influence the unaffected flows, we have two approaches discussed
below.
Flow modification
One of the approaches is to assign lower priority to the affected flows than the unaffected
flows. A similar approach is also discussed in108. That is, the switch routes the flows based
on priority. The affected flows can be routed only when all unaffected flows with higher
priority are delivered. This approach works well to route the unaffected flows first; however,
it does not take limited network resources into consideration. This may lead to packets from
the affected flows being dropped due to queuing-buffer overflow.
Flow accommodation
We propose a local fast-recovery mechanism without modifying the flows. The switch consid-
ers the affected and unaffected flows equally. The affected flows compete with the unaffected
flows for the link bandwidth and middlebox-processing capability. Our approach is to seek
an alternative path with enough bandwidth, and a backup middlebox with enough process-
ing capability, to accommodate the affected flows. In this way, there will be no failure effect
on the unaffected flows. Once several paths are available, we will choose the one that makes
the entire network as balanced as possible. We measure the network balance feature using θ
and expect to choose the path with the smallest θ.
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4.5.4 Traffic demand fluctuation
Our fast local rerouting approach is also applicable to the case where there are minor fluc-
tuations of some flows. For instance, one flow with a minor increase might overwhelm the
middleboxes and links on its routing path. We can seek an alternative path that can ac-
commodate this flow. It can be solved by the local rerouting approach as middlebox-failure
scenarios.
4.6 Evaluation of our fast local rerouting on a Mininet
testbed
In this section, we test our local rerouting approach when there are middlebox failures. We
use the same topology shown in Fig. 4.4. Experiment settings are also the same as those in
section 4.2 unless otherwise specified.
4.6.1 Experiment setup
We measure our fast local rerouting approach, and find how many flows are reallocated with
a new path and how much normalized throughput is increased when failures occur. Based
on our experiment settings, firewalls act as the network bottleneck and can be considered
as critical resources. IDSes are considered as non-critical resources since IDS resources are
relatively sufficient. We also consider three other scenarios for comparisons: global rerouting
flows, using the global LB approach proposed in section 4.2, when failure occurs; dropping
affected flows when failure occurs; and no middlebox failures. We test four scenarios with
the homogeneous traffic matrix.
4.6.2 Major observations from experiment results
When a device with critical resources fails, e.g., FW2, our fast local rerouting requires a
maximum of 21.1 percent flow reallocations of those required in the global rerouting ap-
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proach. When a device with non-critical resources fails, e.g., IDS2, our fast local rerouting
requires a maximum of 9.1 percent flow reallocations.
Moreover, our local rerouting approach achieves good network throughput, compared
with the global rerouting approach. In Fig. 4.7, two subfigures represent the normalized
throughput with a failure on FW2 and IDS2, as examples, respectively. When the failure
occurs on the critical-resource device FW2, our fast local rerouting achieves almost the same
normalized throughput. Results of our fast local rerouting approach reside between the
global rerouting approach and the affected-flows-dropped approach, as expected. Our local
rerouting increases the throughput up to 16.8 percent, compared with the affected-flows-
dropped approach.
4.6.3 Further analysis on experiment results
We test all possible failures occurring on each middlebox, respectively. We obtain a group
of results with the same trend on critical resource devices, namely, firewalls; and the other
group of results with the same trend on non-critical resource devices, namely, IDSes. Thus,
we select one failed firewall and one failed IDS, respectively, as examples in Fig. 4.7.
When the total traffic volume is greater than or equal to 546.0 Mbps, the local rerouting
approach and the global LB approach cannot find better routing paths, since no resource is
available to allow rerouting. When there are failures on IDSes with non-critical resources
and total traffic volume is larger than 546.0 Mbps, global rerouting routing and fast local
rerouting can still find alternative paths with IDS resources, shown in Fig. 4.7. When network
resources are scarce (total traffic volume is 655.2 Mbps), normalized throughput of any curve
converges. As the global rerouting approach achieves near-optimal results, there is a shift
on the normalized throughput, that is, the global rerouting approach dealing with failures
achieves a little bit higher throughput than the one with no failures.
Failures on middleboxes can also overwhelm the links. Let’s examine HTTP traffic. When
a firewall fails, each affected flow arrives at one of the working firewalls and selects one IDS.
Thus, there are (6 − 1) × 5 = 25 working candidate paths, and each affected flow chooses
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Figure 4.7: Failures on different middleboxes. Firewall 2 is connected to Switch 4, and IDS
2 is connected to Switch 5. Firewall 2 provides critical resources while IDS 2 does not.
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the best one. Near-optimal routing paths can always be found. However, an IDS’s failure
is different from a firewall’s, as the IDS is the last-type middlebox in the policy sequence.
When an IDS fails, each affected flow arrives at one working IDS and then routes along the
shortest path to its destination. There are fewer alternative paths (5 − 1 = 4); thus, some
links can be more easily overloaded.
4.7 Discussion of network scalability
We discuss network scalability to verify the practicability of our approaches. First, we
narrowed the choices of candidate paths to accelerate the routing path selection procedure.
Then we demonstrated the upper bounds of the number of flow entries in subsection 4.2.4.
The number of flow entries on each switch scales linearly as the number of distinct types
of middleboxes in a middlebox chain increases. It also linearly depends on the number of
demand pairs. The number of flow entries on each switch is within the switch-processing
capability, since  and #switch increase simultaneously and are canceled out. Furthermore,
the SAN algorithm approximates the optimal solution effectively. In addition, our design of
fast local rerouting indicated only affected flows need to be rerouted during the restarting
period of the failed middlebox. This mechanism is realized locally, which does not disturb
the working subnetwork. This is a great feature that supports network topology’s scalability.
Possible limitations of scaling the network reside in the controller, which include the diffi-
culty of synchronized communication between the controller and all switches, the controller’s
limited processing capability, etc. Distributed controller techniques can help reduce the bur-
den on the controller109. The problem on how to exploit the benefits of the centralized SDN
controller and scale the controller’s processing capability remains an open question in SDN
research and is beyond the scope of our work.
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4.8 Contributions
In this chapter, we formulate a mixed-integer linear programming problem to achieve a net-
work load-balancing objective in the context of sequenced-middlebox policy routing. Our
global routing approach manages network resources efficiently by simplifying candidate-path
selections, balancing the entire network, and using the simulated annealing algorithm. More-
over, in the case of middlebox failures, we design a fast recovery mechanism by exploiting
the remaining link and middlebox resources locally. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
first work to handle failures in the middlebox chain scenarios using OpenFlow. Finally, we
implement proposed routing approaches on a Mininet testbed and evaluate the experiments’
scalability, assessing the effectiveness of the approaches. Results of the optimization on a
test topology include an increase up to 26.4 percent of the throughput, with respect to a
sequenced shortest-path routing.
Our contributions are listed as follows:
1. We design an efficient routing strategy for middlebox policy enforcement.
2. We consider limited network resources (link loads, middlebox loads, and switch capabili-
ties) and formulate a novel flow management problem.
3. We design a fast local rerouting approach to handle middlebox failures.
4. We implement branch-and-bound, simulated annealing, and greedy algorithms to make
efficient routing decisions.




Robustness of SDN control plane
In this chapter, we evaluate and improve the robustness of the SDN control plane. First,
we discuss DoS attacks and SDN vulnerabilities. Second, we build an adversary model to
describe in detail how to launch DoS attacks to overwhelm the SDN controller. Third,
we implement a successful distributed DoS attack on the Mininet testbed. In section 5.4,
we discuss possible defense mechanisms and present our preliminary results. Finally, we
summarize our contributions at the end of this chapter.
5.1 DoS attacks
5.1.1 Definition
Attackers send a large number of requests to exhaust server resources, so that servers cannot
serve requests from legitimate users. This is called the DoS attack. Classic DoS attacks
target services such as a web server, a DNS server, etc.66
5.1.2 Severe consequences
DoS attacks lead to severe problems. In 2016, major websites such as Twitter, Netflix,
Spotify, Airbnb, Reddit etc., couldn’t be accessed for more than two hours, because Do-
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main Name System (DNS) provider Dyn was under DDoS attacks. Furthermore, the most
powerful DDoS attack in the first half of 2016 consumed 579 gigabits per second (Gbps) of
bandwidth110.
DDoS attacks pose an immense threat to the Internet, resulting in millions of dollars
in losses for companies. Attackers are constantly exploiting possible Internet vulnerabilities
to launch DDoS attacks, and researchers are improving their defense mechanisms to tackle
those attacks. Mirkovic et al. provided a thorough survey on the classification of existing
DDoS attacks and defense mechanisms66.
5.1.3 Mitigation of DoS attacks using SDN
As SDN emerges, it provides more possibilities to mitigate DoS attacks. For example, SDN
helps acquire flow information, and then pattern matching and machine learning techniques
are used to identify DDoS attacks32;33. Moreover, the SDN controller gains an overview of the
entire network and monitors network anomalies111;112. In addition, SDN is able to flexibly
route flows through security devices to identify attacks, as discussed in chapter 4. After
identifying attacks, SDN can react toward potential threats by simply dropping malicious
flows.
5.1.4 SDN vulnerabilities
In a traditional network, DoS attacks normally only affect one service. However, in an
SDN network, the DoS of the controller is destructive to the entire network, since the SDN
controller centrally provides services to all the flows. As today’s network is a hybrid of
both traditional and SDN networks, attackers first investigate which network is using SDN
and then launch a controller DoS attack. Shin et al. presented an SDN scanner to test
whether the targeted network is likely to be an SDN network68. Other works are focusing on
mitigating the controller DoS attack, given an SDN network62;67;71. In our work, we assume
an SDN network is given.
The OpenFlow controller can behave proactively or reactively. The proactive behavior
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means forwarding rules are installed beforehand, while the reactive one means the controller
installs forwarding rules requested by switches on the fly62. The proactive behavior reduces
communication overhead between the controller and switches. However, the reactive behavior
enables more flexibility, and flow entries are installed as requested in order to save flow-
table space. We are focusing on the reactive behavior, as it is more widely used in today’s
OpenFlow networks. When a new flow arrives at the network, the switch will ask the
controller first, and then the controller will calculate the forwarding rule for this packet.
This feature enables the dynamics of OpenFlow; however, it requires the controller’s fast
and massive calculations. Such calculations might overwhelm the controller, so that the
controller provides slow responses or no responses to the requests. This will give the attackers
an opportunity to launch the controller DoS attack.
5.2 Detailed adversary model
In this section, we build a controller DoS attack model from the attacker’s point of view. The
most successful attack is to break down the controller, consequently destroying the entire
network.
5.2.1 Problem statement
In the header field of an OpenFlow flow entry, 12 different fields are aiming at providing
fine-grained control and QoS guarantee, as defined in OpenFlow 1.0. Wildcard rules on the
switch can help reduce the number of requests from the data plane. However, the attacker
can always send numerous table-miss packets. Thus, we assume 12 fields need to be one-
to-one equivalent when packets match flow entries. To launch a DoS attack, attackers can
craft arbitrarily many random values to each field. For example, the destination IP address
can be crafted with up to 232 possibilities, though many of them are reserved IP addresses
or invalid ones. Moreover, one of the IP addresses can be combined with another field, such
as a destination port number, to represent another packet. The number of crafted packets
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grows exponentially. When a switch receives a packet, the switch looks up a matching flow
entry for it. However, those crafted packets are very unlikely to match a flow entry and
force the switch to send requests to the controller. Then, the controller receives excessive
attack requests and fails to respond to legitimate requests. Consequently, the entire network
is destroyed. This is called “controller saturation attack”.
5.2.2 Attack scenarios
Attackers expect to break down the controller with a small cost. Ideally, a single attacker can
generate a huge number of table-miss packets and force the switch to inquire the controller.
We define “request rate” as the number of packet-in messages sent from the switch to the
controller in a unit of time. As long as the request rate is larger than the controller’s
processing capability, the controller cannot serve requests from legitimate users in a timely
manner. The attack scenario is shown in Fig. 5.1. The switch is a simple Open Vswitch,
and the controller is a POX l2 learning controller.
Now, we briefly discuss how attackers bypass current security systems in controller sat-
uration attacks. First, they craft a huge number of short packets, and the aggregation flow
rate is very small, thus bypassing the rate-limiting method. Second, they can create packets
regardless of a specific protocol to make a protocol-based defense mechanism, say proxy,
ineffective. Third, they can replay some real packets captured in the past to avoid security
devices’ pattern inspection.
5.3 Implementation of DoS attacks
Our emulations are conducted on the Mininet testbed. We use “hping3” command to craft
packets113. The command is —
hping3 10.0.0.1 -i u200 --rand-source -d 80 -c 2000
The parameters are described as follows:
• u200: send one packet every 200 millisecond.
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Figure 5.1: Test scenario 1: The attacker, switch S1, and the controller are involved in the
DoS attack. The attacker conducts attacks through S1 toward the controller. Without loss
of generality, we add an additional switch S2 and four hosts to represent the test scenario.
Network topologies can consist of many switches and thousands of hosts.
• rand-source: a random source IP address is assigned for ease of crafting table-miss
packets.
• d 80: craft packets with the size of 80 bytes each.
• c 2000: send 2000 packets in total. This is used together with the “u” parameter to
set the test duration.
5.3.1 Measurement of DoS effects
We notice there are no standard methods to measure DoS effects. Some measurements are
used in the above-mentioned papers, for example, how fast will attacks succeed73, monitor
CPU/memory usage62, or the delay that a legitimate user will experience71. We agree on
measuring DoS effects based on controller availability71, that is, sending a probe to test the
delay the probe experiences. This measurement is more intuitive than monitoring CPU’s
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usages, because a CPU’s 100 percent usage indicates the controller is either best utilized or
congested. Moreover, we are arguing probes should be sent at a proper rate: fast enough to
get better time resolution; slow enough to avoid unnecessary burden on the controller.
5.3.2 DoS attack from a single attacker
Experiment setup
The attack scenario is shown in Fig. 5.1. The attacker, switch S1, and the controller are
involved in the DoS attack. The attacker conducts attacks through S1 toward the controller.
Without loss of generality, we add an additional switch S2 and four hosts to represent the
test scenario. Network topologies can consist of many switches and thousands of hosts.
Host H1 sends ICMP packets to H2 in order to measure the round-trip time (RTT), which
includes the controller processing time and switch S1 processing time. When an ICMP packet
arrives at the switch, the switch does not have any matching flow entry and then inquires
of the controller for actions. The controller and switch S1 are both involved during this
process. If the controller or the switch is congested, the round-trip time becomes large. In
our experiments, H1 sends an ICMP packet every one second for 10 seconds. The controller
instructs the ICMP packet with an action to its destination, but does not install any flow
entry. This ensures each measured RTT includes both the switch and controller processing
time. Otherwise, the subsequent ICMP packets will find a matching flow entry and follow
its actions without asking the controller.
Experiment 1
In Fig. 5.2, the X axis represents the attacking rate increase from 500 packets per second
(PPS) to 1500 PPS from the attacker. The Y axis is the RTT between H1 and H2. We
send repeated ICMP packets with an interval of 1s for 10 seconds. Each dot in Fig. 5.2 is
the average of RTTs for 100 runs. When the attacking rate is between 1,100 and 1,200, the
network becomes congested.
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Figure 5.2: The network becomes congested when attacks are launched.
Experiment 2
We measure the total number of packets received on switch S1 and the total number of
packet-in packets received by the controller, shown in Fig. 5.3. The green curve indicates
the ideal amount of packets sent from the attacker. The red curve represents total packets
received on switch S1. And the blue curve shows total packets received on the controller.
When the attacking rate is larger than 1,000 PPS, total packets received by the controller
remain the same. This might indicate the switch reaches its capability of generating packet-
in packets, shown in Fig. 5.2, or that the controller cannot receive and process those inquires.
Another experiment will be conducted to conclude.
Experiment 3
We further measure controller availability from another switch S2 to circumvent the limi-
tation of switch S1. The network is indicated in Fig. 5.4. Now S2 and its two hosts, H3
and H4, are used for testing controller availability. H3 sends ICMP packets to H4. At the
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Figure 5.3: There is only one attacker in the network. The green curve indicates the ideal
amount of packets sent from the attacker. The red curve represents total packets received
on the switch. The blue curve shows total packets received on the controller.
beginning, we are launching a 1,000 PPS attack from a single attacker. All those packets
from the attacker are expected to be sent through its connected switch S1, and then S1
will inquire the controller. However, we’ve noticed no matter how high the sending rate is,
the controller can still be accessed by probe requests. More results will be presented and
discussed in subsection 5.3.3.
We conclude the controller is never congested when there is only one attacker. The
controller cannot be successfully overloaded, no matter how many attackers are connected
with one switch. Combined with results from experiment 2, we can conclude that the switch
reaches its capability of generating packet-in packets. We can also conclude the switch’s low
processing capability protects the controller from overload to some extent.
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Figure 5.4: Test scenario 2: S2, and its two hosts H3 and H4, only work for testing controller
availability.
5.3.3 Distributed DoS attacks
Compared with DoS attacks, DDoS attackers will first compromise lots of hosts, then launch
attacks toward the controller using all these compromised hosts.
Launching a DDoS attack
Figure 5.5: Test scenario 3: N is the number of attackers. Each attacker has to be connected
with a separated switch. We measure the controller availability using a test switch, and its
two hosts H1 and H2.
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An attack scenario is indicated in Fig. 5.5. We launch DDoS attacks when there is one
attacker, 10 attackers, and 20 attackers, respectively. Each attacker has to be connected
with a separated switch to avoid reaching the switch’s processing limitation. We measure
controller availability using a test switch and two hosts, H1 and H2, connected to it. We
measure the round-trip time (RTT) using ICMP packets sent from H1 to H2. Results are
shown in Fig. 5.6. Generally, as the attacking rate increases, legitimate requests become more
difficult to be served. Ideally, RTT should keep increasing all the way when the attacking
rate is increasing. However, in the 10-attacker results, the curve becomes flat when the
attacking rate is greater than 150 PPS per attacker. This is because, when the aggregation
attacking rate is around 1500 PPS, the controller’s CPU is overwhelmed. Compared with
the green curve, we conclude as the number of attackers increases, the controller availability
decreases.
Figure 5.6: Results of RTTs represent controller availability. We launch DoS attacks when
there is a single attacker, 10 attackers, and 20 attackers, respectively. Each attacker must
be connected with a separated switch.
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Observations
We make the following observations:
The limitation on the switch bothers us when testing controller availability from the
discussion above. Such a limitation can be considered as packet-in generation ability. In
Mininet, the generation ability of a software switch is about 500 packets/second62. Hard-
ware switches have similar performances114. However, the controller processing ability is
larger than the switch packet-in generation ability in reality, which is validated through our
experiments. Thus, one attacker cannot break down the controller by creating massive table-
miss packets. Instead, the attacker can only overload the switch software components, and
the hosts connected with that switch are affected. We can also conclude the switch’s low pro-
cessing capability protects the controller from overload in real implementations. Thus, the
simulation results, regardless of real implementation in67, are no longer sufficient. Moreover,
with DDoS attacks, we’ve successfully decreased the controller’s availability.
5.4 Discussion of countermeasures
5.4.1 Challenges
To design defense mechanisms, a list of considerations should be noted. First, how do we
measure DoS effects? On one side, we need to know when the controller is under a DDoS
attack. On the other side, it helps measure effectiveness of defense mechanisms. Second,
how do we differentiate legitimate requests from attack requests? We do not expect to block
the requests from legitimate users accidentally. Third, defense mechanisms do not include
any switch modification and are able to mitigate the general request-flooding attacks, as
indicated in chapter 2. We expect to mitigate such attacks from the controller’s side, which
is flexible and does not include data plane’s modifications67;71. However, the controller, which
is supposed to mitigate attacks, is also a victim in the request-flooding attack scenario. This
is strikingly different from current DDoS defense mechanisms, which are independent from
the victim. We should guarantee the controller is still able to identify and respond to attacks
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when it is under attacks.
5.4.2 Proposed work and preliminary results
Differentiating legitimate users from attackers
The differentiation between legitimate users and attackers is challenging in a DoS attack.
Mirkovic et al. argued that once IP spoofing is solved, many other kinds of DDoS attacks
could be solved through fair-sharing among hosts66. Zhang et al. proposed a multi-layer fair
queueing method to guarantee legitimate users are served. However, whether the controller
has enough CPU and memory to manage the smart queueing is questionable. Instead,
blocking mechanisms can be used to protect the network indefinitely. We propose to slow
down suspicious attacks temporarily for further verification. Once attacks are verified, we
block them. Simultaneously, we can protect burst requests from legitimate users and a
reasonable delay will be added in exchange. The processing diagram of our proposed defense
mechanism is presented in Fig. 5.7. In this diagram, “queue” does not refer to packet
queueing buffers at the controller. Instead, it is a data structure to store packets’ arriving
time.
Protect the controller
For controller-side defense mechanisms67;71, a striking challenge is whether the controller is
still able to respond to attacks when it is under attacks. Consequently, our fundamental goal
is to make the controller work all the time.
1. Sliding-window method
Normally, we measure the attacking rate by counting the total number of attacking packets
per time slot. Let’s consider an attack scenario where the request rate is far more than
the controller’s processing rate. Before we get the rate of requests, the controller will be
saturated no matter how small the time slot is set. Our first step is to use a sliding-window
method. For example, if we want to block all users with the new request rate larger than
76
Figure 5.7: Processing diagram of defense mechanisms.
100 PPS. We set the sliding-window size as 100. Once the window is full within one
second, we start our defense mechanism. Ideally, as the attacking rate increases, our
response is faster.
2. Block suspicious hosts
Once attacks are detected, the controller sends a traffic control command to the switch
and the switch blocks the attackers. We can easily implement traffic control commands
on Mininet, since Mininet depends on the Linux kernel. Moreover, this operation has also
been supported by hardware switches. For example, the controller can run shell or CLI
vendor extension commands on the switch in the Arista’s OpenFlow implementation115.
3. Drop coming packets
Lots of packets may be on the way before traffic control is effective. The controller drops
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the packets on itself, and also adds a flow entry on the switch to match and drop all
packets from suspicious users. It’s quite straightforward to identify the attacker’s real
IP address, since its IP address is associated with its MAC address, and we can get the
physical port of the attacker as well in the OpenFlow network.
4. Virtual functionality separation
We propose to virtually separate the controller into two sections. One section is used to
conduct general processing of requests. The other section conducts defense mechanisms
to mitigate attacks.
Preliminary results
Figure 5.8: Attacking rate is 130 PPS/attacker. X-axis indicates number of attackers. Blue
histogram represents controller availability under attacks. Yellow histogram represents con-
troller availability after applying the blocking mechanism.
We modify a remote POX controller to accomplish blocking DDoS attacks using the
sliding-window method as an example. We set the window size as 100. After identifying the
attacks, we block the attackers. We still use the ICMP request to measure the RTTs. In
Fig. 5.8, we use the 9th-second RTT result at which the network becomes stable.
This blocking mechanism works well when the network becomes stable, as shown in
Fig. 5.8. However, during our tests, we’ve noticed the controller is still congested before the
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blocking mechanism is applied. Thus, this creates possibilities for attackers to circumvent
our defense mechanism when the attacking rate is high enough, and a great many compro-
mise hosts are connected with different switches. We have also implemented the method to
differentiate legitimate users from attackers. Our detailed adversary model provides a fun-
damental and thorough analysis of SDN controller’s vulnerability. Our preliminary defense
mechanism can inspire and encourage more works for this topic.
5.5 Contributions
In this chapter, we study robustness of the control plane by evaluating its vulnerabilities. By
implementing DoS attacks from the attackers’ point of view, we demonstrate how attackers
explore the control plane’s vulnerabilities. In fact, implementations indicate that limited
switch capability protects the controller. We thoroughly discuss possible defense mechanisms
from the controller side, and present our preliminary results. This chapter represents a
fundamental research step for studying the SDN control plane’s vulnerabilities and inspires
more research on this topic. Our contributions are listed as follows:
1. We build a detailed DDoS adversary model.
2. We perform a thorough analysis on defense mechanisms.
3. We design a scalable and lightweight DDoS attack defense mechanism to protect the
controller from saturation attacks, and present preliminary results.




Conclusion and future work
6.1 Conclusion
In this dissertation, we work on enhancing network robustness. As defined in chapter 1,
network robustness is the network ability to withstand possible network failures or attacks;
and it ensures network availability, resilience, and adaption to changing scenarios. Our work
stresses the importance of studying network robustness, which is a complex topic attracting
researchers’ attention. Use of SDN creates many possibilities to address network robustness
issues. First, we present a robust cyber-physical network framework in chapter 3. Second, we
solve the middlebox chain problem, which is a critical network robustness issue addressable
with SDN in chapter 4. It’s important to note that SDN networks also have vulnerabilities.
Third, we demonstrate how attackers can exploit those vulnerabilities on the SDN control
plane and present preliminary results on defense mechanisms in chapter 5.
In chapter 3, we propose a novel interdependent network model to pursue increased
robustness of cyber-physical systems by properly allocating dependency links. We have con-
sidered one-to-multiple weighted dependency links between two individual networks, rather
than simply adopting the one-to-one node dependency model. This enhanced realistic model
highly complicates the design. Moreover, we formulate two optimization problems to allocate
weighted dependency links under a limited budget, and a revised network flow algorithm is
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adapted to obtain a basic network structure in an effective way. To the author’s best knowl-
edge, this is the first work to apply the concept of limited budget to arrange dependency
links from an engineering perspective. Simulations on dependency-link allocation strategies
in both random networks and real network topologies are performed to validate our strategies
and to identify the critical failure rate.
In chapter 4, we have explained how the middlebox policy chain can help networks
enhance robustness and accomplish various network functionalities. We demonstrate how to
solve critical issues in the middlebox chain problem. The middlebox policy makes the network
routing problem more difficult. To solve this problem, we formulate an MILP optimization
problem to allocate limited network resources and then use the simulated annealing algorithm
to find a near-optimal solution. The solution of the optimization problem selects one path
out of the candidate paths to be assigned to each flow for load balancing. The global load-
balancing routing not only distributes network loads well, but also keeps the number of flow
entries on each switch within the range of its processing capability. Furthermore, we propose
a fast local rerouting approach to tackle middlebox failures. The rerouting has no effect on
the working part of the network and can respond to middlebox failures quickly. Finally, our
experiments on Mininet validate the efficiency and effectiveness of our approach, and attest
to the feasibility of applying our approaches to real networks. On our test topology, our
load-balancing (LB) approach shows an increase up to 26.4 percent on the throughput and
much lower end-to-end latency, when compared with the shortest-path (SP) approach. Our
fast local rerouting approach achieves similar results to the global rerouting approach: both
approaches increase the throughput up to 16.8 percent, compared with the affected-flows-
dropped approach.
In chapter 5, we build an adversary model to describe in detail how to launch DDoS at-
tacks to overwhelm the SDN controller. This stresses the importance of studying the control
plane’s vulnerability to protect the network from a destructive disaster. We discuss DoS
attacks in both traditional and SDN networks. Furthermore, we implement a successful DoS
attack on the Mininet testbed to demonstrate its achievability in the real world. Finally, we
highlight the challenges to mitigate such attacks and present our preliminary results on pos-
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sible defense mechanisms. Results indicate a mechanism based on a sliding-window method
can successfully mitigate DoS attacks. In summary, this chapter represents a fundamental
research step for studying SDN control vulnerabilities and can inspire more research on this
topic.
6.2 Future work
In this dissertation, we research many aspects of enhancing network robustness. However,
open questions still require further investigation.
As the cascading failure is destructive to cyber-physical systems, protecting critical nodes
can prevent the network from triggering cascading behaviors. For example, we can assign
more resources to hubs or high-load nodes, but the effectiveness of such approaches needs
to be researched. How SDN techniques can be incorporated to dynamically allocate those
resources and distribute loads in interdependent-network scenarios also needs further inves-
tigation.
Moreover, middleboxes provide network functionalities to balance loads and detect net-
work anomalies. However, we can always face the situation where middlebox resources are
inadequate. Sometimes, we have to route flows quite far away to be served by the middlebox
with adequate resources. This issue needs to be addressed, because it consumes more link
bandwidth and produces additional delay. Network function virtualization (NFV) could be
a good solution by allocating resources with more flexibility. NFV is an emerging technol-
ogy aiming at using software components to gradually substitute for hardware middleboxes.
Multiple functionalities can be deployed on one workstation and share resources. Therefore,
resources are utilized with more flexibility and effectiveness. Associated problems should be
addressed, for example, location selection and resource allocation of NFV functions.
The final issue is control plane vulnerability. In chapter 5, we have presented a thor-
ough analysis on this issue. In the future, a comprehensive solution regarding the proposed
challenges listed in section 5.4 is required to fully protect an SDN network from controller
saturation attacks. Additionally, the controller must respond rapidly to attacks, so efficient
82
solutions are needed to this end.
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